Were There no Appeal: The History of Review in American Criminal Courts by Rossman, David
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 81
Issue 3 Fall Article 3
Fall 1990
Were There no Appeal: The History of Review in
American Criminal Courts
David Rossman
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Criminal Law is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
David Rossman, Were There no Appeal: The History of Review in American Criminal Courts, 81 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 518
(1990-1991)
0091-4169/90/8103-518
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 81, No. 3
Copyright © 1990 by Northwestern University, School of Law Printed in U.S.A.
"WERE THERE NO APPEAL"*: THE
HISTORY OF REVIEW IN AMERICAN
CRIMINAL COURTS
David Rossman**
The contemporary criminal justice system is guided, in large
part, from the top down. A great deal of the force that drives the
"terrible engine" of the criminal law is supplied by courts that con-
sider cases on review after a defendant has been convicted.
Appellate courts determining cases in the context of review give
the final stamp of approval to the validity of convictions. With ap-
peal an almost automatic sequel to trial, it seems as if society must
withhold its judgment about a defendant until the review process is
finished. Contemporary appellate review has taken on the quality of
an extension to the trial.
For their part, defendants and their attorneys shape their be-
havior to accommodate review as another stage in the long battle to
avoid punishment. Defense counsel are constantly mindful of the
need during trial to preserve the record for an eventual appeal.
Moreover, every defense attorney has met with a case where he or
she raises an issue at trial knowing full well it will not be successful,
in hopes that he or she will find a more congenial audience on
appeal.
Review not only provides additional opportunities for defend-
ants to avoid conviction, it also has come to be seen as the final
guarantor of the fairness of the criminal process. Appellate courts
examine individual cases to ensure that convictions are not so in-
* Nor is there anything novel in allowing appeals to the supreme court. Actions
are mostly to be tried in the state where the crimes are committed - But appeals are
allowed under our present confederation, and no person complains; nay, were there
no appeal, every man would have reason to complain, especially when a final
judgment, in an inferior court, should affect property to a large amount.
Pamphlet of Noah Webster, addressed to Benjamin Franklin, on the proposed Constitu-
tion, October 10, 1787, in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 53
(P. Ford ed. 1888) (reprinted 1968).
** Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. This paper benefitted from
comments by members of the Boston University School of Law faculty research seminar
and by Professor Wythe Holt of the University of Alabama Law School.
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fected with error that society should refuse to honor the trial court's
judgment. Reversal on appeal is the quality control mechanism of
the criminal justice system.
We have come to rely on review to shape the criminal process
on more than an individual level. We invariably look to the opinions
of reviewing courts, especially the appellate courts at the top of the
judicial hierarchy, to announce the rules which must guide the be-
havior of the official actors in the criminal justice system. While
confined to the context of affirming or reversing criminal convic-
tions, these courts set forth the boundaries within which police,
prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys must operate if they wish
to conform to the rules.
The role of review in the contemporary criminal justice system
is so pervasive that it is easy to assume this feature is a constitutional
requirement. Review seems as fundamental an aspect of the system
as trial by jury or the right to defense counsel.' After all, every state
and the federal system provide some means of review to defendants
in criminal cases. However, according to a long line of Supreme
Court opinions, there is no constitutional mandate that states pro-
vide any type of review process for defendants convicted in their
criminal courts. As far as the Constitution is concerned, a state
could eliminate everything but its trial courts.2
A criminal trial process that literally adhered to the Supreme
Court's pronouncement that there is no right to appeal in criminal
cases would create an unacceptable risk ofjeopardizing defendants'
rights to life and liberty, as each lower court judge would possess
absolute, unreviewable discretion over the legal issues at trial. This
model of unchecked power seems so at odds with the carefully
bounded limits the Bill of Rights otherwise places on the power of
the state that the dissonance is jarring. One only can wonder why a
feature like review, which is so central to the legitimacy of the cur-
rent criminal justice system, does not have a constitutional basis.
This article's thesis is that the conventional argument about the
lack of constitutional support for a right to appeal in criminal cases
misreads history because it ignores the differences between the
1 Neither of these requirements is absolute, since the Constitution demands juries
only in non-petty cases and defense attorneys in misdemeanors only when the defendant
has received a sentence of imprisonment. But in the balance of cases, which encompass
all serious criminal prosecutions, these features must be offered to the defendant.
2 The Constitution does speak to the issue of habeas corpus; it therefore implies the
existence of a federal forum to review criminal cases that a state would not. However,
traditional wisdom posits that the Constitution requires neither the states nor the fed-
eral government to review their own criminal convictions.
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eighteenth century view of how criminal courts should operate and
our contemporary vision. The model of the criminal justice system
with which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, and which
they implemented in the first federal court system, contained many
features that gave it the same advantages that appellate review pro-
vides today.
The first section of the article traces the genesis of the doctrine
that the Constitution does not require review in criminal cases. The
idea rests ultimately on an 1805 decision, which held that the
Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction under the First Judiciary
Act to entertain a writ of error in a criminal case. In order to evalu-
ate how the Supreme Court's lack of jurisdiction over writs of error
in criminal cases bears on the question of whether the framers' con-
ception of due process would have encompassed a contemporary
criminal trial without any possibility of review, the article's second
section examines the early American criminal trial process in some
detail. The third section of the article takes a closer look at the his-
tory of criminal litigation in the federal courts. It first examines the
debates over the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the First Judi-
ciary Act dealing with review in criminal cases. One of the impor-
tant points that surfaces from this discussion is that criminal appeals
were seen in some quarters as a danger to individual rights because
of the fear that the government might seek review of an acquittal.
The section then proceeds to examine four features of the early fed-
eral court's criminal process which gave it many of the characteris-
tics of contemporary review. The fourth and final section of the
article concludes that a fair reading of the historical record supports
an argument that while review per se may not have been seen as a
fundamental right of criminal defendants, there is nothing to sug-
gest that the Due Process Clause was intended to condone leaving
the final determination of all constitutional issues to an individual
trial judge.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF REVIEW IN FEDERAL
CRIMINAL CASES
One need not look very far to find a Supreme Court decision
that holds there is no constitutional right to an appeal. A 1983
habeas corpus case,Jones v. Barnes,3 is an apt example. The Court in
Jones dealt with the refusal of an indigent defendant's appellate
counsel to present in his brief or argument a non-frivolous issue
that his client wished to use to attack the client's conviction. The
3 463 U.S. 745 (1983).
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majority opinion, which found that the attorney's refusal was not a
constitutional violation, contained a statement which has been
sprinkled liberally in one form or another throughout various cases
dealing with the appellate process in the past thirty years: "There
is, of course, no constitutional right to an appeal."
4
These twentieth century statements of the relationship between
the Constitution and the right to appeal in criminal cases have their
immediate genesis in an 1894 case, McKane v. Durston.5 The appel-
lant in McKane, which was another habeas corpus case, challenged a
New York state court practice that denied defendants bail pending
appeal as a matter of right. In rejecting the claim that this policy
denied the defendant the "privileges and immunities of citizens in
the several states" guaranteed by Article IV of the Constitution, the
Court stated:
An appeal from a judgment of conviction is not a matter of absolute
right, independently of constitutional or statutory provisions allowing
such appeal. A review by an appellate court of the final judgment in a
criminal case, however grave the offense of which the accused is con-
victed, was not at common-law and is not now a necessary element of
due process of law. It is wholly within the discretion of the State to
allow or not to allow such a review. A citation of authorities upon the
point is unnecessary.
6
The offhand dismissal of the constitutional claim in McKane
stemmed from the fact that at the time of the decision, appellate
review of criminal cases in the Supreme Court was only five years
old.
For roughly the first hundred years of the federal courts, there
was no right of review in criminal cases. Congress did not provide
the circuit courts with the power to review federal criminal convic-
tions until 1879. 7 Moreover, Congress waited until 1889 to give the
4 Id. at 751. See also Evitts v. Lucy, 469 U.S. 387, 393 (1985); Abney v. United States,
431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977); Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 536 (1975); Blackledge v.
Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 25 n.4 (1974); Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600, 611 (1974); North Caro-
lina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 719 (1969); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20-21 (1956);
Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940); Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505,
508 (1903).
5 153 U.S. 684 (1894).
6 Id. at 687. It was unnecessary for the court to have made the statement in McKane
concerning the lack of a constitutional requirement for the right to appeal. There was
no reason to assert that defendants lacked a constitutional right to appeal in order to
dispose of the far more limited question of whether they had an absolute right to bail
pending appeal. Moreover, in none of the twentieth century cases repeating the dictum
of McKane was the due process right to appeal a necessary ingredient of the Court's
decision.
7 Act of Mar. 3, 1879, ch. 176, 20 Stat. 354.
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Supreme Court jurisdiction to entertain writs of error s in criminal
cases from the lower federal courts. 9
The First Judiciary Act, enacted in 1789, implemented the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction by permitting writs of error
to review judgments of the Circuit Courts' ° in civil cases where the
matter in controversy exceeded $2,000 in value." I The Act made no
explicit provision for writs of error in criminal cases.
12
Whether litigants could obtain writs of error in federal criminal
cases in the years immediately following the First Judiciary Act was
an unresolved question. Justice Chase apparently thought writs
were available. Presiding over the trial of James Thompson Cal-
lender for seditious libel in 1800, Chase remarked to defense coun-
sel in explaining his refusal to allow a witness to testify:
[B]ut if I am not right, it is an error injudgment, and you can state the
proceedings on the record so as to show any error, and I shall be the
first man to grant you the benefit of a new trial by granting you a writ
of error in the Supreme Court.'
3
Three years later, the Supreme Court actually entertained a writ
of error in a criminal case. In United States v. Simms, 14 the prosecutor
in the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia brought a writ of
error seeking to reverse a lower court decision which held that the
indictment did not charge a crime within the jurisdiction of the
court. ChiefJustice Marshall wrote the opinion, affirming the judg-
ment for the defendant. Neither the Court nor the parties explicitly
8 Writs of error were the traditional format the common law provided for reviewing
a lower court's judgment. The writ was an independent action in a higher court, con-
ceptually quite unlike a contemporary appeal. The court which issued the writ first had
to obtain the record of the proceeding in the trial court, and then had to determine if it
was defective because of an error. See Sunderland, The Problem of Appellate Review, 5
TEXAS L. REv. 126, 139 (1927) [hereinafter Sunderland].
9 Act ofJan. 25, 1889, ch. 113, 25 Stat. 656. Section 6 of the Act gave the Supreme
Court the power to issue writs of error to review capital convictions from the circuit
courts where the defendant had been sentenced to death.
10 The First Congress established the Circuit Courts to try all but minor criminal
offenses as well as civil cases.
11 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, sec. 22, 1 Stat. 73.
12 Congress, however, was not displaying a general disregard for constitutional is-
sues in criminal cases by neglecting to allow review in federal criminal cases. See Sager,
Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress'Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Fed-
eral Courts, 95 HARV. L. REv. 17, 25 (1981); Derousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6
Cranch) 307, 314 (1805). Section 25 of the FirstJudiciary Act permitted Supreme Court
review of state cases in which a claim of constitutional privilege had been denied. Under
this provision, the Court could review state criminal convictions. See Cohens v. Virginia,
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
13 United States v. Callender, 25 F. Cas. 239, 251 (C.C. Va. 1800) (No. 14,709).
14 5 U.S. (0 Cranch) 252 (1803).
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considered the Court's jurisdiction to issue the writ as a threshold
matter.
When the next writ of error for a criminal case came before the
Court in 1805, however, the matter of its appellate jurisdiction was
laid to rest. The case, United States v. More,15 also originated in the
Circuit Court of the District of Columbia. In the lower court, the
judges sustained a demurrer to an indictment charging a District of
Columbia magistrate with collecting fees illegally. When the gov-
ernment sought a writ of error, Chief Justice Marshall raised the
question of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction on his own initiative.
The prosecutor in More, John Mason, also had represented the
government in Simms. Mason argued that Article III section 2 of the
Constitution gave the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction in all
cases of law (of which this was one) subject only to Congress' ex-
pressly promulgated exceptions. When Congress granted the Court
the power to issue writs of error in civil cases, it never expressly
forbade their use in criminal cases. Thus, Mason concluded, the
Court had appellate jurisdiction in criminal as well as civil cases. In
addition, Mason argued that the Court's authority to issue these
writs was provided by the fourteenth section of the Judiciary Act of
1789, which gave federal courts the power to issue all writs "neces-
sary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable
to the principles and usages of law."'
16
Mason concluded his argument by asserting that it made no
sense to allow the writ in civil cases, where only property was at
issue, but to deny it in criminal cases, where a criminal defendant
stood in jeopardy of life or liberty. Errors, Mason noted, were as
likely to occur in the latter context as in the former. Moreover, writs
of error in criminal cases were hardly novel. They were frequently
available in England,' 7 and the Supreme Court already had demon-
strated the power to issue such writs in Simms. i8
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion dealt only with the Court's ju-
15 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159 (1805). More was originally tried in front of a three judge
panel which included the ChiefJustice's brother andJudges Cranch and Kilty. None of
them was a Supreme Court Justice.
16 Act Of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, sec. 14, 1 Stat. 81.
17 The practice in England was to allow writs of error in misdemeanor cases; in fel-
ony cases, the writ had to have the express approval of the prosecutor.
18 The report of the case does not contain any mention of defense counsel present-
ing an argument to the Court on the jurisdictional issue, although it was typical for the
reporter to summarize the arguments on both sides. The report does contain, however,
an account of the presentation that More's attorney gave on the merits of the case, prior
to ChiefJustice Marshall's suggestion that the Court lacked jurisdiction. See More, 7 U.S.
(3 Cranch) at 165-69.
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risdiction to entertain writs of error in criminal cases. 19 Marshall
dismissed the authority of Simms on the ground that it had never
raised the question of the Court's jurisdiction. His opinion relied
solely on a construction of section 22 of the First Judiciary Act,
which dealt with the Court's jurisdiction to issue the writ in civil
cases. Marshall interpreted the Act's affirmative grant of jurisdic-
tion in a limited class of cases to mean that Congress intended to
withhold jurisdiction in the balance of cases in which the Constitu-
tion would have allowed the Court to exercise its appellate power.
2 0
He made no mention of the policy argument that Mason raised, nor
did he refer to any other principle that would shed light on why he
chose to restrict the Court's jurisdiction in such a manner.
21
Thus, if one traces back through the centuries from Jones to Mc-
Kane to More, the principle that there is no constitutional right to
review in criminal cases seems firmly based on history. It is indispu-
table that the original plan for the federal courts did not include a
provision for review of criminal convictions, and, shortly after the
adoption of the Constitution, the Supreme Court found no reason
to infer such a power. History seems a dead end to an argument
that due process requires review of a criminal conviction.
To leave the trail at this point, however, would be premature.
Although federal procedure in the eighteenth century did not per-
mit writs of error for criminal cases, other features of the early crim-
inal process did provide some of the advantages that contemporary
review grants defendants convicted in modern courts.
2 2
19 The Court in More need not have addressed the broad jurisdictional questions
because it had a narrower ground on which to refuse to entertain the writ. Since it was
the government that sought access to the court, not the defendant, the Court could have
relied on the long recognized disfavor with which the common law viewed government
appeals. In fact, this reason moved the Court to reach the same result as More in United
States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310 (1892), when the government sought again to appeal a
trial judge's dismissal of an indictment. Sanges came three years after the Court had
been given jurisdiction to review criminal cases in general.
20 More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) at 173.
21 Justice Story speculated on the reason that the Supreme Court lacked appellate
criminal jurisdiction in a case that arose 17 years after More. In Ex Parte Kearney, 20 U.S.
(7 Wheat.) 38 (1822), a habeas corpus case in which the petitioner sought to obtain his
release from confinement for contempt, Justice Story wrote in refusing to grant the writ:
[The Supreme Court] cannot entertain a writ of error, to revise the judgment of the
Circuit Court, in any case where a party has been convicted of a public offence. And
undoubtedly the denial of this authority proceeded upon great principles of public
policy and convenience. If every party had a right to bring before this Court every
case, in which judgment passed against him, for a crime or misdemeanor or felony,
the course of justice might be materially delayed and obstructed, and, in some
cases, totally frustrated.
Id. at 42.
22 These features are described in section II.B, infra.
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One cannot fully understand how the framers of the federal ju-
dicial system developed a policy denying review of criminal cases
without some background on how the eighteenth century state
courts dealt with the issue. The manner through which the states
provided defendants in criminal cases with the advantages of review,
either directly or indirectly, helped shape the federal view of the
matter.
II. THE HISTORY OF REVIEW IN STATE CRIMINAL CASES
Since the Supreme Court relied entirely on the historical record
to support its denial of a constitutional basis for a right to review in
criminal cases, a detailed examination of the criminal procedure in
existence at the time of the adoption of the constitution is war-
ranted. However, it is important to recall that appellate review in the
eighteenth century was quite different than the process today.
Appeals, through which a higher court reviews the entire case
developed at the trial level and has the power to render a judgment
based on an overall assessment of the quality of the verdict, were
not part of the common law tradition. 23 Instead, common law re-
view was accomplished by the use of a writ of error, 24 which pro-
vided rather limited means of examining the record of a trial court
for errors apparent on its face. It was, unlike an appeal, an original
action, not a continuation of the case that had been litigated in the
trial court.25 The conception of the process was, literally, to try the
record below to determine if an error existed. 26 Thus, it had a lim-
ited scope. For example, a court considering a writ of error could
not consider any question concerning the evidence introduced at
the trial, since the record did not include an account of the evi-
dence.27 The entire process lent itself to a quite mechanical
application.2
8
Writs of error were available at common law in criminal cases
only in limited circumstances. Prior to 1700, the writ did not issue
as a matter of right in any class of criminal cases. 29 Thereafter, mis-
demeanor defendants had free access to it, but defendants in felony
cases needed the Attorney General's approval, which was a matter
23 See Sunderland, supra note 8, at 139, 143.
24 Id. at 130.
25 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 409 (1821).
26 See Hood, The Right to Appeal, 29 LA. L. REV. 498, 499 (1969).
27 See Sunderland, supra note 8, at 142.
28 See Pound, Introduction to L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA 5-9 (1939)
[hereinafter L. ORFIELD].
29 See L. ORFIELD, supra note 28, at 23.
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of grace.30 In England, in fact, it was not until 1907 that felony de-
fendants had the right to review their convictions.3
1
A. THE ORGANIZATION OF STATE CRIMINAL COURTS
Although the administration of justice in the new Republic was
overwhelmingly a matter of state rather than federal concern, the
state court systems largely existed to adjudicate civil controversies.
Criminal cases in colonial days typically made up no more than ten
percent of the docket of the general trial courts, 32 and there is no
reason to believe that the mix of cases after the Revolution was any
different. Nevertheless, each state, following common law practice,
constructed a series of specialized courts for the adjudication of
crime. While the same judges heard civil as well as criminal cases,
the title of the court and the procedures it used depended on the
type of case at trial. In civil cases, common pleas ruled, while in
criminal cases, pleas of the crown governed procedure.
The organization of criminal courts in early America followed a
pattern based on the English criminal justice system.3 3 Justices of
30 J. ARCHBOLD, A COMPLETE PRACTICAL TREATISE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 725
(Waterman ed. 1860) [hereinafter J. ARCHBOLD]; L. ORFIELD, supra note 28, at 23; I.
STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 310 (1883). The requirement
that the Attorney General consent to the defendant's use of a writ of error has been
explained as stemming from the fact that defendants could use this means of review to
reverse convictions for the most trifling slips of form. See J. BAKER, THE LEGAL PROFES-
SION AND THE COMMON LAW 299 (1986).
31 See 7 Edw. 7, ch. 23 (1907); L. ORFIELD, supra note 28, at 28-3 1; M. KNIGHT, CRIMI-
NAL APPEALS (1970).
32 CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA, Introduction at xvii (Hoffer ed.
1984) [hereinafter CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS]; C. CHAPIN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN COLONIAL
AMERICA, 1606 - 1660 76 (1983) [hereinafter C. CHAPIN]; Flaherty, Criminal Practice in
Provincial Massachusetts in LAW IN COLONIAL MASSACHUSETrS, 1630-1800, 192 (Colonial
Society of Massachusetts 1984).
33 For a general overview of the criminal justice systems of the early state courts, see
S. BALDWIN, THE AMERICAN JUDICIARY (1905); C. CHAPIN, supra note 32; and R. POUND,
ORGANIZATION OF COURTS (1940) [hereinafter R. POUND, ORGANIZATION]. For details
concerning each of the thirteen original states, see the following: Connecticut I. DAVIS,
THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN CONNECTICUT (1963) [hereinafter I. DAVIS]; E.
GOODWIN, THE MAGISTRACY REDISCOVERED; CONNECTICUT, 1636-1818 (1981) [hereinaf-
ter E. GOODWIN]; Z. SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
(1796). Delaware THE FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE (198 1); J. MUNROE, COLO-
NIAL DELAWARE - A HISTORY, (1978). Georgia B. ALMAND, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF GEORGIA (1948) [hereinafter B. ALMAND]; K. COLEMAN, COLONIAL GEORGIA, A
HISTORY (1976) [hereinafter K. COLEMAN]. Maryland C. BOND, THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND, A HISTORY (1928) [hereinafter C. BOND]. Massachusetts G. HASKINS, LAW
AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS (1960) [hereinafter G. HASKINS]; W. NELSON,
DISPUTE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN PLYMOUTH COUNTY, MASSACHUSETTS, 1725-1825
(1981) [hereinafter W. NELSON]. New Hampshire E. PAGE, JUDICIAL BEGINNINGS IN NEW
HAMPSHIRE, 1640-1700 (1959). New Jersey R. FIELD, THE PROVINCIAL COURTS OF NEW
JERSEY (N.Y. 1849) [hereinafter R. FIELD]; J. POMFRET, COLONIAL NEW JERSEY: A HIS-
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the Peace occupied the bottom rung. These local magistrates rarely
were trained in the law, but were empowered to dispense justice to
miscreants who faced only the most minor punishment. Justices of
the Peace ordinarily did not preside over jury trials, which all the
colonies guaranteed to those charged with non-petty offenses. 34 Ju-
ries for non-petty offenses were provided by a layer of courts that
were termed the General Sessions of the Peace, or the Quarter Ses-
sions. These courts met four times a year, and typically provided for
a bench composed of selected justices of the peace. Sessions Courts
had trial jurisdiction over misdemeanors, could impanel grand ju-
ries to return indictments, and could commit those charged with a
crime to jail if they failed to meet their bail conditions. The Ses-
sions Courts could not, however, try those who faced indictable
offenses.
3 5
The judges who had the power to try these more serious cases
had to operate under a broader grant of authority or commission.
Three general commissions existed which empowered judges to ad-
judicate felony cases: Gaol Delivery, Oyer and Terminer, and Nisi
Prius. These commissions were exercised mainly by judges riding
circuit on a county-wide basis. The circuit judges, unlike the gentry
who served as magistrates, were trained in the law, and were
thought more competent to deal with the legal issues that might
arise in complex and serious criminal matters. The pool of judges
from which the circuits typically drew was composed of members of
the jurisdiction's highest court. Even the justices of a colony's
supreme court were expected to leave the seat of government and
TORY (1973). New York J. GOEBEL & T. NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW
YORK (1970) [hereinafterJ. GOEBEL & T. NAUGHTON]. North Carolina THE FIRST LAWS OF
THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA (1984); H. LEFLER & W. POWELL, COLONIAL NORTH CAR-
OLINA - A HISTORY (1973). Pennsylvania H. BRACKENRIDGE, LAW MISCELLANIES (1814)
(reprinted 1972) [hereinafter H. BRACKENRIDGE]; W. LOYD, THE EARLY COURTS OF PENN-
SYLVANIA (1910) (reprinted 1986) [hereinafter W. LOYD]. Rhode Island P. CONLEY, DE-
MOCRACY IN DECLINE, RHODE ISLAND'S CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (1977)
[hereinafter P. CONLEY]. South Carolina THE FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CARO-
LINA (1981); R. WEIR, COLONIAL SOUTH CAROLINA - A HISTORY (1983). Virginia W. BILL-
INGS, J. SELBY & T. TATE, COLONIAL VIRGINIA, A HISTORY (1986) [hereinafter W.
BILLINGS, COLONIAL VIRGINIA]; 0. CHrrwoOD, JUSTICE IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA (1905) (re-
printed 1971) [hereinafter 0. CHrrwoOD]; CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 32; A.
ROEBER, FAITHFUL MAGISTRATES AND REPUBLICAN LAWYERS, CREATORS OF VIRGINIA
LEGAL CULTURE (1981); A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA (1930) [herein-
after A. SCOTT].
34 See Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guarantee of
Trial by Jury, 39 HARV. L. REV. 917, 936-65 (1926); C. BOND, supra note 33, at 19
(Maryland).
35 Colonial Quarter Sessions ordinarily had no power over cases involving life and
limb, while English Quarter Sessions did. See C. CHAPIN, supra note 32, at 84.
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go out to the frontier to represent the King's, and later the State's,
justice by presiding over felony trials.
Gaol Delivery operated as a clearing house for prisoners who
had been indicted by a grand jury supervised by General Sessions.
It possessed all of the power of a general jurisdiction felony trial
court, except it lacked the ability to preside over its own grand jury.
The power of Oyer and Terminer, to hear and determine, included
the ability not only to try felony cases, but also to initiate them
through the grand jury process.
Circuit judges also operated under a third grant of authority,
acting as nisi prius courts. In a nisi prius case, the full bench would
preside over the pre-trial pleadings, the most complex and challeng-
ing portions of the proceedings, before remitting the actual trial to
the venue where the crime occurred. Nisi prius jurisdiction resulted
from the highest court's exercise of original trial jurisdiction over
the most serious felony cases. In some colonies, for example, all
capital crimes had to be tried by the supreme court. 36 Not all of
these trials took place before the full bench. Such a trial would have
required all the witnesses to travel to whatever city the court typi-
cally sat in, and travel in colonial days presented a considerable trav-
ail. 37 Typically, the full bench would oversee the pre-trial pleadings.
A circuit-riding judge would conduct the trial, and would proceed
so far as to receive a verdict, but would withhold formal judgment.
The case would then return to the full bench for entry of judgment
and consideration of post-verdict challenges to the conviction.
B. FEATURES OF STATE CRIMINAL TRIALS: HIGH COURT DECISIONS,
POST-CONVICTION REVIEW, AND MULTI-JUDGE BENCHES
Thus far, we have not identified a feature of the early American
criminal court system that is strictly analogous to our criminal jus-
tice system's process of review. Yet, such mechanisms existed. A
number of states allowed convicted defendants to appeal their cases
and to receive trials de novo at a higher level in the court system.
Defendants also could institute a separate action in a higher court
using a writ of error, arguing that the judgment below was defective
because of a mistake of law. However, even before examining how
prevalent these forms of review were, the search for a historical an-
swer to the inquiry how our forbearers viewed review requires an
36 See, e.g., W. NELSON, supra note 33, at 24 (Massachusetts).
37 In Maryland, for example, it was a rough rule of thumb that witnesses would be
allowed one day for each 15 miles that they had to travel to get to court. See C. BOND,
supra note 33, at 94.
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examination of the differences between the way trials were con-
ducted in the past and the way trials are conducted presently. Sev-
eral aspects of the states' criminal trial process at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution bear on the question of whether any
historical support exists for features similar to modern day review.
1. High Court Decisions
The first significant feature of the eighteenth century American
trial system was that a defendant in a serious case typically could
obtain the resolution of an issue relevant to his trial by the highest
judicial authority that existed in the jurisdiction. 38 A defendant in a
non-petty case was not subject to the unchecked exercise of power
by a lower court judge who might decide a legal point in a way that
varied from the state's organic law.
Means existed to provide felony trial judges with the institu-
tional point of view of the jurisdiction's highest court even when no
formal contact occurred between the two levels of the court system.
Although a trial might begin and end before a panel of circuit riding
judges exercising the power of Gaol Delivery or Oyer and Terminer,
the decisions the panel made were likely to reflect the view of the
jurisdiction's highest court by virtue of the fact that the judges were
members of the higher court as well. Sir Matthew Hale's History of
the Common Law, a basic text found in the library of colonial law-
yers, 39 explained one of the advantages of the circuit system:
[b]y this means their judgments and their administration of common
justice, carry a consonancy, congruity and uniformity one to another; whereby
both the laws and the administrations thereof, are preserved from that
confusion and disparity that would unavoidably ensue, if the adminis-
tration was by several incommunicating hands, or by provincial
establishments .40
Supreme court judges not only conducted trials while riding
circuit, but colonial and state high courts also conducted trials
under a grant of original jurisdiction. The notion that the highest
legal authority should function as a trial court was, in part, an inheri-
tance from colonial legislatures. At the time of the Revolution, im-
portant criminal cases were tried by the legislative branch of the
government, and this practice was within the recent memory of
many colonial judges. In a number of the colonies,4 1 the legisla-
38 See R. POUND, ORGANIZATION, supra note 33, at 67-72.
39 See J. GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECED-
ENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801 472 n.40 (1971) [hereinafterJ. GOEBEL].
40 M. HALE, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 289 (4th ed. 1779) (emphasis in original).
41 See C. CHAPIN, supra note 32, at 69-74 ("from the beginning, colonial legislatures
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tures undertook the burden of resolving criminal cases themselves.
The practice of consolidating legislative and judicial functions
was obsolete by the end of the eighteenth century. However, in
most of the new states' court systems, the state's highest court typi-
cally conducted the trials of the most serious crimes. 42 Thus, any
legal questions that arose in the course of these trials were resolved
as if the defendant was given an automatic right of review to the
state's supreme court. The advantage of modem review, which al-
lows the state's ultimate legal authority the opportunity to ensure
that a conviction is in accord with their interpretation of the law, was
achieved by the colonial criminal justice systems' practice of empow-
ering their high courtjudges with the sole responsibility for the case
from its inception.
Even if a case did not originate in the highest judicial arena, it
could be removed there for trial. In New York, for example, the
state supreme court could order inferior tribunals to transmit the
records of their pending cases to it for trial by the use of writs of
certiorari.43 Defendants also could instigate this removal process by
seeking certiorari, and lower courts could invite the parties to do so
in cases presenting difficult questions that appeared on the record.
44
Thus, at either the request of the defendant or of the prosecution,
the litigation could proceed in the state's highest court.45
The last feature of the early criminal trial system that gave de-
fendants the opportunity to obtain the judgment of their state's
highest court, even without any review mechanism, was the common
practice of trial judges reserving complex or novel questions of law
and reporting them, either formally or informally, to the high court
for a definitive resolution. The operation of nisi prius cases repre-
sented one form of this referral practice. In a nisiprius trial, though,
regarded themselves as the highest courts in their jurisdictions"); see also E. Goodwin,
supra note 33, at 76 (Connecticut); 0. CHITWOOD, supra note 33, at 19 (Virginia).
42 See, e.g., W. NELSON, supra note 33, at 23 (Massachusetts).
43 Both the Circuit and General Sessions courts were the subject of this type of su-
pervision. SeeJ. GOEBEL & T. NAUGHTON, supra note 33, at 257, 261. See, e.g., People v.
Townsend, 1 Johns. Cas. 103 (N.Y. 1799).
44 See, e.g., People v. Lent, 2 Wheeler's Crim. Cases 548 (N.Y. Gen. Sess. 1819) (de-
fendant invited by court to apply for certiorari). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also
controlled the course of the criminal justice system in the lower courts by exercising its
power of certiorari and removing a case initially begun in Quarter Sessions or one of the
circuit courts. See infra note 45.
45 See, e.g., Respublica v. Cleaver, 4 Yeates 69 (Pa. 1804) (removed at request of pros-
ecutor from Quarter Sessions to Circuit Court); Commonwealth v. Franklin, 4 Dall. 255,
256 (Pa. 1802); Respublica v. Duquest, 2 Yeates 493 (Pa. 1799) (removed by agreement
from Mayor's Court to Supreme Court).
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the high court itself instituted the mechanism for case referral. 46
When questions were reserved and reported, however, it was at the
initiative of the trial judge, at a stage when the defendant could in-
fluence the forum in which the legal issue was determined.
One is struck by the degree to which the opinions decided in
the context of such a referral system resemble those of contempo-
rary appellate courts. In the 1790 New Jersey case of State v. Wells,4
7
the defendant, who was convicted of manslaughter, moved for a new
trial, alleging errors in both the judge's instructions to the jury and
his rulings on admitting and excluding evidence. 48 The judge, who
had doubts about whether he had misconceived the law, reserved
and reported the case to the New Jersey Supreme Court for resolu-
tion.49 The new trial motion, argued before the New Jersey
Supreme Court, was denied on the ground that if an error had oc-
curred at trial, it did not fundamentally affect the verdict. 50 Penn-
sylvania,5 1 Virginia, 52 and North Carolina 53 judges all made
46 See, e.g., People v. Croswell, 3 Wheeler's Crim. Cases 330, 381 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804)
(describing nisi prius practice as one where "the defendant thought proper to carry his
cause before a tribunal constituted for the trial of issues of fact alone, where it is the
invariable practice to reserve all doubtful points of law for a decision at bar"); see alsoJ.
GOEBEL & T. NAUGHTON, supra note 33, at 78.
47 1 N.J.L. 486 (N.J. 1790). Another example of a case reported from Oyer and Ter-
miner to the Supreme Court for determination of a legal issue is State v. Aaron, 4 NJ.L.
263-66 (N.J. 1818).
48 Wells, 1 N.J.L. at 491.
49 Id. at 487.
50 Id. at 493.
51 In Pennsylvania, a major mechanism for promoting uniformity was for judges to
settle among themselves disputed points of law that arose in the course of a trial. When
only a few judges of the state's supreme court sat as a trial bench and faced a controver-
sial question of law, it was common for them to reserve their decision and report the
matter to the full bench for resolution. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Franklin, 4 Dall. 255,
255-58 (Pa. 1802) (prosecutor and defense counsel agreed that the question of the con-
stitutionality of the statute on which the indictment was based should be argued in the
state supreme court, before all the judges); see also Respublica v. Cleaver, 4 Yeates 69,
69-74 (Pa. 1804).
52 Virginia's court of general trial jurisdiction was the General Court. The bench of
the General Court could reserve a ruling on a perplexing question of law and report it
for decision to the Court of Appeals. See Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5
(1782). The General Court also functioned in the same capacity, providing answers as a
full bench on disputed questions of law referred by constituent members while riding
circuit as trial judges in the District Court. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Feely, 2 Wheeler's
Crim. Cases 585 (Va. Gen. Ct. 1813); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 2 Wheeler's Crim.
Cases 471 (Va. Gen. Ct. 1796); Commonwealth v. Crane, 2 Wheeler's Crim. Cases 586
(Va. Gen. Ct. 1791); Commonwealth v. Richards, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 1 (1789); Temple v.
Commonwealth, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 168 (1789).
53 If a question of law arose which posed a difficulty for trial judges in North Caro-
lina, they could reserve their decision and report the matter to the full bench of the
Superior Court, sitting as a Court of Conference. See, e.g., State v. Boon, 1 N.C. (1 Tay.)
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extensive use of this referral mechanism to obtain more authorita-
tive answers than an individual trial judge could provide.
Georgia was the only state that did not allow its judges to ob-
tain advice from other members of the judiciary in making decisions
at trial. The state constitution of 1798 established a superior court,
which had exclusive and final jurisdiction in all criminal cases. 54 Su-
perior court judges were prohibited from reserving and reporting
vexing questions of law to the full bench of the superior court for
resolution. In addition, legislation passed in 1801 prohibited the
full bench from deciding such issues and required that the presiding
judge dispose of the case in the county where the trial was held. 55
Although Georgia judges formally were required to determine
the legal issues raised at trial themselves, they were able to consult
on an informal basis. State v. Monaquas56 is one example. The de-
fendants in Monaquas, who were convicted of murder in the Septem-
ber 1805 term, filed a motion in arrest ofjudgment that presented
the judge with an issue of first impression. Rather than deciding the
case immediately after argument of counsel, the judge remanded
the prisoners to the jail and announced that he would solicit the
opinions of the judges of the other circuits of the superior court. At
the May term of the court, the defendants were again set to the bar,




The second aspect of the early American criminal trial system
that is similar to a feature afforded by modern day review was devel-
oped as a consequence of the format in which the defendant could
raise objections to the proceedings. Defendants not only had an op-
portunity to raise legal points as they became relevant in the course
of the trial, but they also had the ability to renew those points after
conviction in a motion to arrest the judgment or in a motion for a
new trial. The motion in arrest ofjudgment was confined to errors
that were apparent on the record,58 while a motion for a new trial
191 (1801). The North Carolina Superior Court judges served en banc as a Court of
Conference from 1776 to 1818. See L. ORFIELD, supra note 28, at 217.
54 GA. CONST. of 1798, art. III, sec. 1, reprinted in THE FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF
GEORGIA 39 (1981).
55 B. ALMAND, supra note 33, at 1.
56 1 Charlton Rep. 16 (Ga. 1805).
57 Id. at 23.
58 See Commonwealth v. Judd, 3 Wheeler's Crim. Cases 293 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct.
1807) (motion in arrest ofjudgment on ground of variance between verdict and indict-
ment denied); People v. Thompson, 2 Johns. Cas. 342 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1801) (motion in
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allowed the defendant to raise issues that were grounded in the evi-
dence. 59 Through the use of these devices, defense attorneys could
obtain for their clients a second look at a legal issue that had origi-
nally been decided against them.60 The trial court's initial determi-
nation of an issue was not final. Although review was available only
in front of the same group of judges, it existed nevertheless.61
These post-conviction motions offered the judges an opportu-
nity to reflect at greater length on a legal issue than was possible
during the hectic pace of the trial itself. Thus, even without a for-
malized review process, time for reflection, a hallmark of the con-
temporary appellate process, clearly existed. As one commentator
noted in 1824:
It is, of course, expected, that the verdict will be rendered as at nisi
prius, under the unprepared, and sudden directions of the judge, who
arrest ofjudgment on ground that indictment does not charge a crime allowed); Com-
monwealth v. Feely, 2 Wheeler's Crim. Cases 585 (Va. Gen. Ct. 1813) (motion in arrest
of judgment allowed on ground that trial court lacked jurisdiction of the offense); J.
ARCHBOLD, supra note 30, at 671-74.
59 See People v. Crowell, 3 Wheeler's Crim. Cases 330 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804) (new trial
motion on ground of error in judge's instructions and in excluding evidence offered by
defendant; nisi prius trial judge was one of the four en banc justices who considered the
motion); People v. Dalton, 2 Wheeler's Grim. Cases 161 (N.Y. Gen'l Sess. 1823) (at
court's suggestion, defendant consented to entry of guilty verdict and case reserved for
opinion of the court; defendant did not want to be confined to grounds cognizable on
motion in arrest ofjudgment only, and with leave of court, was allowed to move for a
new trial as well; relief denied on former grounds but allowed on latter); J. ARCHBOLD,
supra note 30, at 610-70. While new trial motions in felony cases were not granted in
England under the common law, the American courts freely used the device. See People
v. Morrison, I Parker's Crim. Cases 625 (N.Y. 1854) (extensive discussion of history of
new trial motions in 18th and 19th century American courts). Where the defendant's
motion for a new trial was based on a claim that the verdict was against the weight of the
evidence, or on a claim that newly discovered evidence created a doubt about his guilt,
courts were more reluctant to entertain the claim than when the new trial motion was
based on other grounds. See People v. Harper, 1 Wheeler's Crim. Cases 495 (N.Y. Gen'l
Sess. 1819). One reason for the reluctance to allow new trial motions solely based on
the weight of the evidence was the fear that the prosecution might use this device to set
aside acquittals. See People v. The Sessions of Chenango, 1 Cai. R. 319, 320 (N.Y.
1797).
60 For example, allegations that the indictment was defective were frequently found
in the cases reported in the context of a motion in arrest ofjudgment, but they could be
raised prior to the trial by the use of a demurrer. See, e.g., People v. Conger, 1 Wheeler's
Grim. Cases 448 (N.Y. Gen'l Sess. 1813); Commonwealth v. Myers, 3 Wheeler's Crim.
Cases 545 (Va. Gen. Ct. 1811).
61 In New York, it appears that motions to arrest judgment were only infrequently
used prior to 1776; this may be a consequence of the fact that success on the motion
would result only in the prosecutor seeking a new indictment. See J. GOEBEL & T.
NAUGHTON, supra note 33, at 278. See, e.g., People v. Philips, I Wheeler's Crim. Cases
155 (N.Y. Rec. Ct. 1823) (defendants successfully object to indictment on ground that
name of victim was misspelled; court dismissed indictment but ordered defendants held
to answer to new indictment).
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has no other opportunity of correcting his errors or those of the jury,
but on a motion for a new trial. 6
2
These post-conviction motions provided expansive remedial
opportunities. A defendant could challenge his or her conviction on
the ground of a defect in the indictment process, the means by
which the jury was selected, lack ofjurisdiction in the court, or other
procedural irregularities. 63 The niceties of eighteenth century crim-
inal procedure gave defendants in some ways even greater opportu-
nities to overturn their convictions than they have today. 4 For
example, in an 1802 North Carolina case, State v. Carter,65 the judges
entertained a motion to arrest the judgment in a murder case on the
ground that the indictment was faulty in describing the location of
the mortal wound-it spelled the word "breast" at one point with-
out the "a." Despite the fact that the judges who voted in the ma-
jority felt that their conclusion could "not easily ... be reconciled to
good sense or sound understanding,- 66 the court arrested the
judgment.
3. Multi-Judge Trials
The third feature of eighteenth century criminal trials that
raises a point of similarity with contemporary review is the number
of judges who considered the legal issues raised by trial counsel.
The legal arguments that defense attorneys made before trial (on
pleas in bar and pleas in abatement), during trial (on points of evi-
dence and rulings on instructions to the jury), and after conviction
(on motions in arrest ofjudgment or for a new trial) were presented
not simply to one judge but, as in a modern appellate argument, to a
panel.
Trials of all but the most trivial offenses in state courts normally
were held in front of a multi-judge bench. Typically, felony trials
62 Preface to I Charlton Rep. iii-iv (Ga. 1824).
63 j. GOEBEL & T. NAUGHTON, supra note 33, at 272-78; see, e.g., People v. Barrett &
Ward, 2 Cai. R. 304 (N.Y. 1805).
64 See I. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 284 (1883) (The
highly technical grounds on which defendants succeeded in overturning their convic-
tions "[did mitigate, though in an irrational, capricious manner, the excessive severity
of the old criminal law. There was a strange alternation in the provisions of the law
upon this subject, by which irrational advantages were given alternately to the Crown
and to the prisoner.").
65 1 N.C. (1 Tay.) 319 (1802).
66 Id. at 321. See also People v. Quackenboss, I Wheeler's Crim. Cases 91, 92 (N.Y.
Rec. Ct. 1822) (defendant charged with passing a counterfeit note, defense chiefly relied
upon a defect in the indictment that in spelling the name of the cashier who received the
note, the dot over the letter "i" in the name Tim was omitted; the jury acquitted the
defendant on that basis).
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would be held in a court whose judges were members of the state's
highest tribunal. The reports of these early trials chronicle in-
terchanges between the attorneys and the judges, and among the
judges themselves, in ways that mirror the behavior of multi-judge
appellate courts today.67 As reported by the note-takers, the judges
spelled out their reasoning at length, engaged in prolonged discus-
sions among themselves and with counsel, and often disagreed with
each other.6
8
The methods used by judges to resolve disagreements among
themselves varied. When voting on how to resolve an issue, for ex-
ample ruling on a motion, the majority (if there was one) pre-
vailed.69 When multi-judge trial courts were called upon to perform
functions that did not require a vote, the judges performed ser-
iatum. One early court reporter noted, for example, how the prac-
tice of three judge trial courts in New Hampshire sometimes lead to
the jury receiving differing charges from each judge.70
The process by which the panel heard arguments more closely
resembled a modern appellate court than a trial session. For exam-
ple, four of the five members of the Pehnsylvania Supreme Court sat
together as a trial bench. Hugh Brackenridge, one of the first jus-
tices of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, described how such a
court operated in the context of a complaint about the inefficiency
of having more than one judge making decisions in a trial context;
he explained:
A paper offered in evidence must be read by the presiding judge, and a
note taken of it. It then comes to the second who must read, and note
also; and to a third, and a fourth who has the same right to read and
note; and, if he does not, at least read, he is under a disadvantage in
67 See, e.g., State v. Norris, 2 N.C. (2 Hayw.) 429 (1796) (multi-judge murder trial in
which judges hear arguments on points of law and direct questions to counsel); Respub-
lica v. Arnold, 3 Yeates 417 (Pa. 1802) (argument before Justices Yeates and Smith in
perjury case on motion in arrest ofjudgment).
68 See, e.g., Norris, 2 N.C. (2 Hayw.) at 429-33 (discussion among two presiding judges
and counsel for both sides on the right of the defendant to put questions to members of
the venire about whether they had already expressed an opinion on the defendant's
guilt).
69 See, e.g., Jones v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. (I Call) 555, 560 (1799) (Statement of
Judge Pendleton, outvoted 2-1, that "My opinion, therefore, is, that thejudgment ought
to be affirmed; but, as a majority of the Court differ from me, it must be reversed.").
70 Reporter's Note, 55 N. H. (7 Shirley) 6-8 (1876). In one notable civil case, the
disagreements in the jury instructions the judges delivered contributed to three succes-
sive hung juries, until on the fourth trial the two associate judges agreed to sit by in
silence and allow the chief judge to charge the jury by himself. Id. at 7. See also Com-
monwealth v. Addison, 4 Dall. 225 (Pa. 1801) ("[e]veryJudge has a right, and emphati-
cally, that is his duty, to deliver his sentiments upon every subject that occurs in Court
... it would be indecent and improper, in any presidingJudge, to attempt to prevent his
associates from the exercise of this right; from the performance of this duty.").
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understanding the cause. By the time it came to a fourth, which was my
place, I found by both bar, and country, such an impatience at the
vexatious delay, that I was led to dispense with looking at it at all; and
to content myself with catching the substance from the argument of
the counsel, or the hearing it cursorily read by them, without seeing it,
which at all times fixes the impression of the contents more forcibly
upon the mind.7 1
While Brackenridge's lament certainly paints a picture of an
inefficient judicial operation, it also describes a process that pro-
vides some of the advantages of modem review by having more than
one judge make the decision.
The combination of these three aspects of the trial system re-
sulted in a mechanism that greatly resembled modem appellate re-
view. In fact, South Carolina's judicial system provided such a
combination as an explicit alternative to review of a criminal case
after conviction. South Carolina did not offer defendants in either
criminal or civil cases the opportunity to obtain writs of error or
appeals in order to review the judgments against them.72 It did,
however, provide multi-judge courts, post-conviction motions, and
an institutionalized version of referring a case for report. South Car-
olina's courts found the result a "more speedy and less expensive" 73
alternative to traditional review, with just as expansive a remedy.
Defendants in criminal cases in post-Revolutionary South Caro-
lina could raise any legal issue they contended bore on the validity
of their conviction before the Constitutional Court.74 Article X of
the constitution provided that at the conclusion of the circuits where
superior court judges held trial, all the judges would meet en banc,
once in Columbia and once in Charleston, "for the purpose of hear-
ing and determining all motions which may be made for new trials,
and in arrest ofjudgments, and such points of law as may be submit-
ted to them."7
5
The Constitutional Court was composed of six judges76 who sat
as a full bench.77 The trial proceedings they reviewed had generally
71 H. BRACKENRIDGE, supra note 33, at 284 (emphasis in original).
72 See Muir & Boyd v. Whitehead, 4 S.C.L. (2 Brev.) 215 (1807).
73 Id. at 217.
74 This court derived its name from the fact that it was established by the constitution
of 1790. See Preface to 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) (1811). The Constitutional Court existed as
South Carolina's only reviewing tribunal until 1836. R. POUND, ORGANIZATION, supra
note 33, at 112-14.
75 THE FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 42 (1981) (Part 2).
76 See State v. Harkness, 3 S.C.L. (1 Brev.) 276 (1803).
77 See State v. Speirin, 3 S.C.L. (I Brev.) 119 (1802) (all 6judges present); State v.
Harding, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 267 (1800) (5 judges present); State v. Connor, 2 S.C.L. (2
Bay) 34 (1796) (4 judges present).
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been conducted by one of their members. 78 Although the proceed-
ings in the Constitutional Court technically were continuations of
the original trials, 79 the judges' decisions had the same impact as if
they were reviewing a case on appeal. The reports of the in-
terchanges between counsel and the judges give a picture of the
type of argument that easily could have occurred in a twentieth cen-
tury appellate court. The reports show that the court considered
the widest range of legal issues. Its cases dealt not only with techni-
cal legal claims that would have been cognizable on a writ of error,
like a defect in the indictment, but also with issues concerning the
sufficiency of the evidence, jury misconduct, and claims that newly
discovered evidence warranted a new trial.80
This right to have one's case considered by an en banc tribunal
gave South Carolina's criminal courts a unique cast among the thir-
teen states.8 ' It illustrates, however, the degree to which the ex-
isting structure of the trial system could provide a defendant with
the advantages of review without resorting to the eighteenth century
devices of an appeal for trial de novo or the use of writs of error.
C. REVIEW MECHANISMS: EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE REVIEW
The criminal justice systems established by each state after the
Revolution were the direct successors of colonial courts that had op-
erated under a regime of direct accountability to the King or Queen.
Under colonial rule, defendants convicted of a crime had access, at
least in theory, to seek redress based upon errors in the proceedings
both across the Atlantic, to the Crown, and to the royal government
in the colonies.
The ultimate forum for review of all colonial court judgments
rendered was the King or Queen, acting through the authority of
the Privy Council. The availability of this type of review was a regu-
lar feature of colonial charters.82 This review, however, usually was
confined to misdemeanor cases where a fine exceeding a certain
amount was imposed as a sentence. 83 Nevertheless, appeals to the
78 See State v. Harding, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 167 (1800) (1 judge).
79 Muir & Boyd, 4 S.C.L. (2 Brev.) 215, 216 (1807).
80 See, e.g., State v. Harding, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 267 (S.C. 1800).
81 R. POUND, ORGANIZATION, supra note 33, at 112 (the Constitutional Court was "out
of line of development ofjudicial organization in the country at large").
82 See id. at 63.
83 See, e.g., R. FIELD, supra note 33, at 238 (Lord Cornbury's Charter of 1702, New
Jersey) ("You are also to permit Appeals to us in Council, all Cases of Fines imposed for
Misdemanours; provided the Fines so imposed, amount to or exceed the value of two
Hundred Pounds, the Appellant first giving good Security"). See also A. Sco-rr, supra note
33, at 115 (same restrictions on appeals to King and Council in Virginia charter).
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Privy Council were attempted by defendants convicted of serious
felonies. Two men convicted of murder in a Pennsylvania court in
1718, for example, presented an unsuccessful appeal to the Privy
Council on the ground that Quakers who sat on the petit jury had
not taken a proper oath. 84
Direct appeals to the Crown, even when theoretically possible,
were too inconvenient and costly to be of much practical signifi-
cance.85 Rhode Island was the only colony whose citizens made any
extensive use of this means of review in criminal cases. 86
Within the boundaries of individual colonies, however, a much
greater flow of cases from the courts to the executive took place.
The Governor and Council operated more or less as an analogy to
the House of Lords in England, and typically held themselves out as
a court of last resort. Judgments of conviction were overturned
both on grounds similar to a modern executive's exercise of clem-
ency and on the basis of some perceived flaw in the judicial process.
In Pennsylvania, for example, this means of review steadily in-
creased after legislation in 1718 required far ranging application of
capital punishment, and the minutes of the council are full of peti-
tions for relief from capital convictions.
87
Even after the break from England, some states kept open a
legislative avenue of review. At the start of the Revolution, the New
Jersey Constitution provided for the existence of the same courts as
under English rule. New Jersey gave the Governor and Council re-
sponsibility as a Court of Appeals of last resort for all causes of law,
specifically providing that they "possess the power of granting par-
dons to criminals after condemnation in all cases of treason, felony
or other offences. ' '8 8 Where a formal grant of this type of power
was not expressly given to the executive, it was still possible for de-
fendants to ask the court to recommend that the executive authori-
ties grant a pardon.
89
84 See R. FIELD, supra note 33, at 84-85. See also K. COLEMAN, supra note 33, at 107-08
(providing an account of an appeal to Privy Council in 1734 by wife of Georgia defend-
ant convicted of using unguarded expressions and committed for lunacy).
85 See 0. CHTWOOD, supra note 33, at 18, 31; J. GOEBEL & T. NAUGHTON, supra note
33, at 224, 238; K. COLEMAN, supra note 33, at 178.
86 See P. CONLEY, supra note 33, at 44.
87 See W. LOYD, supra note 33, at 87. Similarly, in Maryland, the Governor and Coun-
cil were given the power, by legislation beginning in 1694, to hear appeals and entertain
writs of error in civil cases from the Provincial Court. Although the legislation did not
explicitly authorize review in criminal cases, writs or error were actually used in criminal
cases as well, one as early as May 13, 1699. See C. BOND, supra note 33, at 26.
88 NJ. CONST. art. IX, reprinted in THE FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY vi
(1981).
89 See, e.g., The People v. The Justices of the Sessions of the County of Chenango, 1
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Another feature of early American criminal courts was the
power of colonial legislatures to review convictions and provide re-
dress.90 The New England states, Maryland and Virginia all in-
vested their legislatures with the power to review criminal cases. 91
In Connecticut, for example, the legislature modeled its powers af-
ter the English Parliament, and made itself available to redress
wrongful convictions. 92 It would enact private bills granting new
trials in criminal cases, 93 act as a general court of appeal entertain-
ing questions certified to it by the general jurisdiction trial court,
94
and grant writs of error. 95 Even after the Revolution, defendants
convicted in criminal cases sought relief from the Pennsylvania
legislature. 96
D. REVIEW MECHANISMS: TRIAL DE NOVO
The most expansive type of formal review was an appeal which
allowed the defendant to obtain a trial de novo. 97 Appeal, which was
not part of the criminal common law tradition, existed solely as the
result of specific legislation. All of the New England states as well as
North Carolina provided defendants convicted before a lower court
the right to obtain this form of review. Massachusetts, the most in-
fluential of the New England states, established the model.98 At
each level of the Massachusetts court system, defendants were al-
Johns. Cas. 180, 181 (N.Y. 1797) ("[t]his case is a case of felony in which consideration
of policy and expediency would prevent this court from granting a new trial. In such
cases, the usual course is to recommend the convict for pardon.").
90 See R. POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA, 153 (Cambridge 1945) [hereinafter
R. POUND, CRIMINAL] ("But the practice of review of administrative convictions before
colonial legislatures and the granting of new trials by colonial legislatures after judg-
ment, made us familiar with review of criminal proceedings and granting of new trials
for errors of law."); L. ORFIELD, supra note 28, at 215.
91 See R. POUND, CRIMINAL, supra note 90, at 64.
92 See E. GOODWIN, supra note 33, at 76.
93 This practice finally came to an end in 1815 in People v. Lung, when Judge
Zachariah Swift declared that the judicial power was confined solely to the court system.
Id. at 113.
94 Id. at 79.
95 See I. DAvIs, supra note 33, at 23. See also P. CONLEY, supra note 33, at 40, 42
(Rhode Island Assembly heard appeals and often reversed convictions); 0. CHrrwOOD,
supra note 33, at 17-18, 21, 24-25 (Virginia Assembly heard appeals from both General
Court and county courts until 1682 when it lost its power in a political fight with the
Governor).
96 See, e.g., Respublica v. Oswald, 1 Dall. 319 (Pa. 1788) (defendant, convicted of
contempt for publishing derogatory documents, sought to have the legislature pass a
resolution declaring the sentence unconstitutional).
97 Trial de novo involves the complete rehearing of the case on a clean slate. All legal
and factual issues are redetermined.
98 R. POUND, ORGANIZATION, supra note 33, at 26.
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lowed to appeal to the next tier for a trial de novo. Appeal was avail-
able as a matter of right for all cases from any level of the court
system.99 Thus, for example, if a defendant was found guilty of a
felony by a jury in General Sessions, he or she could appeal for a
trial de novo to the next level of the court system. If convicted again,
he or she could appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court, where the
case would be retried for the third time in front of a newjury with all
the issues of law reargued before the full bench of the Common-
wealth's highest court.' 00
The North Carolina Superior Court also had extensive power of
review over criminal cases originally tried in the lower courts. The
Superior Court could entertain appeals brought by any person dis-
satisfied with the sentence or judgment of the county court of quar-
ter sessions, and grant the defendant a trial de novo.' 0o Obtaining a
trial de novo in the Superior Court was a great advantage to defend-
ants, who could thus escape local passions and untrained county
judges.'0 2 Even slaves could take advantage of this mechanism of
review. In State v. Washington,'0 3 a slave, who was convicted in Quar-
ter Sessions for the rape of a white woman and was sentenced to
death, moved for an appeal to the Superior Court. His motion was
denied. In an effort one can surmise was either an act of loyalty or
an attempt to protect an asset, the defendant's owner obtained a
writ of certiorari and a supersedeas, which stayed the execution of the
sentence. In the Superior Court, the question of the jurisdiction to
hold a trial de novo was reserved and reported. The judges eventu-
ally held that the defendant had an absolute right to a trial de novo,
and the Superior Court had the power to issue whatever writs were
necessary to protect that right.
99 See G. HASKINS, supra note 33, at 199 (appeal available from Justice of the Peace
Courts; also in capital cases tried before a lower court, unlike the practice in England
where review in capital cases was a matter of grace).
100 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Messenger, 4 Mass. 462 (1808). Defendants enjoyed
the right to trial by jury in all criminal cases tried in General Sessions and in the
Supreme Judicial Court. See W. NELSON, supra note 33, at 24.
101 See An Act for Establishing Courts of Law and for Regulating the Proceedings
Therein, art. II, LXXXII & LXXXIV (1777), in THE FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF NORTH
CAROLINA, at 297, 314-15 (1984). Prosecutors in North Carolina also took advantage of
the trial de novo review process, see, e.g., State v. M'Lelland, 1 N.C. (Tay.) 569 (1803),
until the Superior Court declared in 1809 that no appeal could lie from an acquittal. See
State v.Jones, 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 257 (1809).
102 See, e.g., State v. Dickens, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 406 (1796) (sufficiency of indictment on
trial de novo in Superior Court would be judged by the more lenient standards applied to
county court, where indictment originated, than by the more exacting standards of Su-
perior Court); State v. Johnson, 6 N.C. (2 Mur.) 201 (1812).
103 6 N.C. (2 Mur.) 100 (1812).
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E. REVIEW MECHANISMS: WRITS OF ERROR
In England, writs of error were available as a matter of right in
civil cases.' 0 4 In criminal cases, however, writs of error under Eng-
lish common law were available as a matter of right only in misde-
meanors, provided the defendant made a showing to the attorney-
general of sufficient probable cause.' 0 5 In capital cases, such a writ
was granted only upon the express consent of the attorney-general,
which was a matter of grace.' 0 6 In the colonies, however, the prac-
tice of making writs of error available to defendants was more
expansive.1
0 7
Almost all of the states which did not offer trial de novo did allow
review by a writ of error of (at the very least) convictions obtained in
front of a Justice of the Peace or before General Sessions. Courts in
Maryland,' 08 Virginia,' 0 9 New York, 1'0 New Jersey,"'I Delaware"12
104 See III W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 406-11 (N.Y. ed.
1844) [hereinafter W. BLACKSTONE].
105 See IV W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 100, at 392; W. HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE
PLEAS OF THE CROWN 458-62 (1721) (reprinted 1978) [hereinafter W. HAWKINS]. Writs
of error were available only to test judgments from common law courts of record.
Where the court's authority stemmed from a novel source, a writ of certiorari served as
the vehicle to cause the record to be examined for error. SeeJ. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 657 (Boston 1866).
106 Id.
107 See, e.g., Z. SWIFT, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 418
(Conn. 1823) (a writ of error "[i]s a matter of right and will be granted in all criminal
cases, in the same manner as in civil cases").
108 See, e.g., State v. Tibbs, 3 H. & McH. 50 (Md. 1791) (conviction for assault and
battery in General Court reversed in Court of Appeal on a writ of error).
109 See, e.g., Case v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 264 (1812) (writ of error chal-
lenging misdemeanor conviction in county court); Haught v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. (2
Va. Cas.) 3 (1815) (writ of error challenging misdemeanor conviction in county court);
Conner v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 30 (1815) (writ of error awarded by Gen-
eral Court in perjury case, judgment reversed); Smith v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. (2 Va.
Cas.) 6 (1815) (writ of error sought from General Court in second degree murder case,
Court refused to award the writ on the ground that there was no error). The availability
of writs of error, however, did not extend to felony convictions of slaves at Courts of
Oyer and Terminer, as the General Court determined in 1823 that no record in the past
150 years revealed the use of writs of error to review such judgments. See Peter, a Slave
v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 330 (1823).
110 See Act of March 20, 1801 (1 N.Y. Rev. Laws 200) ("writs of error in all civil cases,
and in criminal cases, not capital, shall be considered as writs of right and issue of course
... and in all capital cases writs of error shall be considered as writs of grace, and shall
not issue but upon order of the chancellor made upon motion or petition, notice
whereof shall be given to the attorney general or prosecutor of the people"). See, e.g.,
People v. Rust, 1 Cai. R. 133 (N.Y. 1803) (writ of error). In capital cases, the Chancellor
allowed the writ if he determined that probable cause was shown that a reversible error
existed. See Yates v. People, 6 Johns. 334, 372 (N.Y. 1810). Prior to the enactment of
the statute allowing writs of error, defendants convicted in Oyer and Terminer obtained
review by having the court suspend passing judgment after a verdict of guilty and certify
the issue in question to the supreme court, who considered the point and advised the
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and Pennsylvania 13 all entertained writs of error in criminal cases.
Only Georgia had neither type of review mechanism at any level of
its court system.
Where statutory authority to issue writs of error in criminal
cases did not exist, courts relied on the common law. The Virginia
courts, for example, interpreted the statute dealing with writs of er-
ror to apply only to civil cases, a construction that made sense in
light of the statute's requirement that the judgment exceed a certain
dollar amount. 1 4 Under their common law power, however, the
state courts could entertain writs of error without regard for the
value of the judgment.'15 The writ was available by right, and the
only requirement was that the defendant certify probable cause of
an error existed."1
6
trial judges either to grant a new trial or to proceed tojudgment. See Carnal v. People, 1
Parker's Crim. Cases 262, 268 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1851).
111 See, e.g., State v. Halsey, 4 N.J.L. 369 (1816) (defendant charged with extortion; on
defendant's demurrer, sessions rendered judgment for the state; in supreme court, on
writ of error, judgment for defendant). See also Woodruff v. State, 4 N.J.L. 392 (1817)
(defendant charged with unlicensed sale of liquor; on defendant's demurrer, sessions
rendered judgment for the state; in supreme court, on writ of error, judgment for state).
112 See, e.g., State v. Lowber, 2 Del. Cas. (3 Ridgley) 557 (Del. Ch. 1820). Lowber
presented the question whether the High Court or the Supreme Court was the appropri-
ate forum from which to seek a writ of error challenging a conviction in Sessions. The
court declared the statute of 1760 giving the Supreme Court such jurisdiction, which
had been in force since its enactment, unconstitutional on the grounds that it was incon-
sistent with the mandate given to the High Court under the 1792 constitution. The
system described in Lowber allowed defendants convicted of non-capital crimes in either
Sessions or the General Court to obtain a writ of error in the High Court either with the
consent of the Attorney General or with the permission of a High Court judge. In
Lowber itself, the Attorney General refused to agree to the writ, but the court allowed it.
In capital cases, though, Delaware followed the common law rule that only with the
prosecution's consent could a defendant obtain a writ of error. Id. at 564.
113 See, e.g., M'Nair v. Respublica, 4 Yeates 326 (Pa. 1806); Tryer v. Respublica, 3
Yeates 451 (Pa. 1802); Fitch v. Respublica, 3 Yeates 49 (Pa. 1800); Respublica v.
Honeyman, 2 Dall. 228 (Pa. 1795) (murder conviction in Oyer and Terminer reversed
on writ of error to Pennsylvania Supreme Court).
114 See An Act Constituting the Court of Appeals, Chap. XXII of Acts of 1779, in THE
FIRST LAws OF THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 102 (1982).
115 See Temple v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. (I Va. Cas.) 163 (1789). In colonial times,
the General Court had the power to issue writs of error to county courts. See 0.
CHrrwoOD, supra note 33, at 18, 45; R. POUND, supra note 33, at 54. However, several
historians have concluded that criminal convictions in these minor cases were not ap-
pealable, see W. BILLINGS, COLONIAL VIRGINIA, supra note 33, at 70; CRIMINAL PROCEED-
INGS, supra note 33, at xviii. But see A. Scor, supra note 33, at 113. However, appeals-
involving a retrial-were separate procedures from review by a writ of error. Cf. W.
BLACKSTONE, supra note 104, at 391-94.
116 SeeJones v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 224 (1820).
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F. ATTITUDE TOWARD REVIEW
Of the thirteen original states, only Georgia did not incorporate
some form of review mechanism into its criminal justice system. In
fact, it was not until 1848 that Georgia established a state supreme
court."17 The only type of review that a Georgia defendant could
obtain was either to request a new trial or to move for an arrest of
judgment before the single Superior Court judge who presided over
his trial.'18
Part of the explanation for the lack of review in Georgia's post-
Revolution criminal justice system was widespread antipathy to the
idea of appellate courts in general. In particular, Georgians viewed
the United States Supreme Court with extreme disfavor due to the
political reversals the state government had suffered there. This
aversion to high courts played a role in the internal decision to re-
strict criminal courts to the trial level." t9 A number of other factors
were important as well, such as a fear that a centralized court would
favor the rich over the poor and thereby create an expensive barrier
to the resolution of civil cases.120 Since the highest level of the trial
court was already involved in the resolution of criminal cases, with-
out an appellate court or centralized meeting of the full trial bench,
no effective review existed at all.
1. The Relevance of Individual Rights
The remaining twelve states did not share Georgia's attitude to-
ward review. Review played a role in all of their criminal justice
systems. The reason that review was widespread, however, did not
reflect contemporary concerns. Although the modem rationale for
review in criminal cases places great emphasis on the need to ensure
that each individual defendant receives a fair trial, this atomistic
view of the process played only a minor role in eighteenth century
judicial thought.
Review was not seen as the great protector of defendants' rights
for a number of reasons. One major factor was the idea that any
sort of review would be too late to help the defendant. As one early
117 See B. ALMAND, supra note 33, at 16. All but the most petty criminal cases began
and ended in the Superior Court. Although the Superior Court had review powers over
cases brought in the inferior court, those courts had only civil jurisdiction. Statute of
1797, art. LIX, in THE FIRST LAws OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 636 (1981).
118 See GA. CONST. of 1798, art. III, sec. 1, in THE FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF GEOR-
GIA 39 (1981).
119 See B. ALMAND, supra note 33, at 5.
120 See id. at 14.
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Virginia prosecutor stated in an argument against granting an ap-
peal to the Court of Appeals in an 1803 criminal case:
Several reasons occur why the court should not exercise jurisdiction in
criminal cases. If capital it would be useless, as the judgment would be
executed before the decision here. It if was not capital, but imprison-
ment, the defendant would have suffered the whole or part of the pun-
ishment, before the judgment here. '
2 1
Two factors combined to reach this result. First, the review
process required extensive amounts of time. The reviewing courts
were often far away, and sat infrequently. 122 Second, at common
law a writ of error did not operate to suspend the judgment of the
court below. 123 In order to prevent the defendant from suffering
the penalty his sentence provided for, either the appellate court spe-
cifically had to issue a writ of supersedeas124 or the trial court had to
grant the defendant a reprieve. 125 Neither course was a familiar one
at common law, and it took some time for American judges to adopt
them as solutions to the problem. Judge Brackenridge of Penn-
sylvania complained about the issue in 1816:
With us ... no writ or certiorari, or writ of error, shall be available to
remove an indictment, or stay execution of the judgment in any criminal case;
unless the same shall be specially allowed . . . Some time must inter-
vene before application can be made ... and before the writ of error
can be heard; and in the mean time the sentence must go into part
execution, which is a little like a person, so far as this goes, being
hanged, or whipped first, as the phrase is, and tried afterwards. For
where there was error, there can not be said in strictness, to have been
a trial.
12 6
Brackenridge went on to suggest as a solution, that the trial judge
121 Bedinger v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. (3 Call) 461 (1803). At common law, the fact
that a defendant already may have been executed would not have ended the review pro-
cess. The defendant's heirs could still maintain a writ of error in order to avoid the
consequences to them of an attaint and a corruption of blood, which would have de-
prived them of their inheritance. See J. BEALE, A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL PLEADINGS AND
PRACTICE 376 (1899).
122 See, e.g., Lavett v. People, 7 Cow. 338, 339 (N.Y. 1827) (in speaking about a writ of
error, the court stated, "These proceedings must be attended with great delay, and
prejudice to public justice; and what in the meantime is to be done with the offender?").
123 See Conner v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 30, 32 (1815); Lavett v. People, 7
Cow. 338 (N.Y. 1827) (citing Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2574 (K.B. 1770)). While a writ of
error did not operate per se as a stay, statutes often gave it that attribute. See Carnal v
People, I Parker's Crim. Cases 262, 263, 270 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1851).
124 See Conner v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 30, 32 (1815).
125 At common law, trial judges would reprieve a defendant under sentence in order
to allow the defendant time to seek a pardon, if the defendant was non compos mentos, or if
a woman defendant was quick with child. See W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 104, at 394-95;
W. HAWKINS, supra note 105, at 462 (1721).
126 H. BRACKENRIDGE, supra note 33, at 529.
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grant bail to the defendant, at least in the case of misdemeanors. 127
Another major reason why the early American criminal justice
system did not look upon review as a major component in the pro-
tection of defendants' rights was its view of how the trial system op-
erated. If the trial system was seen as providing all the protection a
defendant would ever need, then there was no reason to extend the
review process to criminal cases. One explanation for this attitude
stems from the system of having circuit riding members of the
state's highest court conduct the most serious criminal trials. When
the high court judges viewed the quality of the trial bench, there
hardly could be cause for alarm that a conviction in the trial court
was the result of the misapplication of the law by judges lacking in
training or wisdom.
A Virginia court in 1803, in Bedinger v. Commonwealth,128 relied
on just this reasoning in narrowly construing the right to appeal to
include only civil cases. In Bedinger, a clerk of court, who had ob-
tained his office by promising to share his fees with a justice of the
peace in return for that magistrate's vote to appoint him to his of-
fice, appealed his bribery conviction to the Court of Appeals. In
seeking to have the high court review his conviction by an appeal,
the defendant advanced a method of review that was not part of the
common law tradition in criminal cases.
129
In the eyes of the appellate judges, there was little cause for
concern about the misapplication of the law by the trial judges of
the Virginia General Court. As the court to which the original Vir-
ginia legislature gave jurisdiction over the most serious offenses, it
127 Id. Courts were reluctant to bail defendants who had been convicted of a felony,
simply to allow them their freedom pending the resolution of a review process. See, e.g.,
State v. Connor, 2 Bay's (S.C.) 34, 36 (1796) (court had no discretion to grant bail after
conviction, because presumption of innocence no longer applied and no security was
sufficient to assure defendant's presence). By the first quarter of the next century,
courts were willing to stay the execution of a judgment to allow a writ of error, by anal-
ogy to the common law power used with cases of pregnant women. See, e.g., Lavett v.
People, 7 Cow. 388 (N.Y. 1827).
128 7 Va. (3 Call) 461 (1803).
129 Recall that appeals were strictly a matter of legislative grace. As the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court stated in an influential 1808 decision, "any jurisdiction vested
in any court must be uncontrollable by appeal, unless the presumption is repelled by
some legal provision; for a right to appeal is a privilege granted to an aggrieved party."
Commonwealth v. Massenger, 4 Mass. 462, 469 (1808). The same attitude toward the
right to appeal appeared in cases throughout the next few decades, dealing with how the
courts should construe the procedural requirements set by the legislature as conditions
precedent to appeal. See. e.g., Commonwealth v. Brigham, 33 Mass. 10 (1834); Com-
monwealth v. Dunham, 39 Mass. 11 (1839). Messenger was influential in other early state
courts. Connecticut, for example, relied on it to support its view that appeals, though
not writs of error, were a matter of grace. See Bowers v. Gorham, 13 Conn. 527, 529
(1840) ("A right to appeal is a privilege granted to an aggrieved party.")
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warranted the highest confidence.1 30 Moreover, the General Court
judges composed the majority of the Court of Appeals bench. As
Judge Roane's opinion in Bedinger stated:
To a court thus constituted and confided in, with whom in the last
resort, these important and extreme cases ofjurisdiction are confess-
edly deposited, it would seem a natural part of the same system to
confide the residuary and inferior classes of criminal jurisprudence. 131
Such benevolence did not extend to judges who lacked the legal
training of the high court bench. This attitude is evident in a 1797
New York case, The People v. The Justices of the Sessions of the County of
Chenango.132 In Chenango, the Supreme Court of New York held that
the Sessions judges did not have the power to grant new trials in
criminal matters based upon their view of the merits of the case.
1 33
Part of their reasoning was that: "The [Sessions judges] are laymen
and cannot be supposed to have been taught or trained in the sci-
ence of the law." 134 The high court justices, though, did not have
the same misgivings about their own competence. As Judge Kent
stated for the court: "I am, with perfect satisfaction, of the opinion,
that this great and transcendent trust, rests solely with this court; a
court which the constitution and law has taken care so to organize,
as to contemplate itfit and competent, for the due and safe exercise of
this very delicate power."'
35
Another explanation for the attitude that review was not
needed to protect defendant's rights also stemmed from how the
judges viewed the trial process. While they conceded that trial
courts made mistakes, they were confident that it was rare for a truly
innocent person to suffer a conviction. Judge Roane noted in Bed-
inger that many parts of the trial system served to prevent injustice:
The tenderness and leaning of our code in favour of the criminal, the
uncontroulable power of the jury to acquit in a criminal case, the par-
doning power of the executive, and the objection to great delays in the
execution of the criminal law, fully justify [the policy of not permitting
an appeal in criminal cases].'
36
This attitude toward the inerrant justice of the trial system sur-
130 Bedinger, 7 Va. (3 Call) at 469.
131 Id. Hamilton's statement in Federalist No. 81 is also illuminating. "In proportion
to the grounds of confidence in, or diffidence of the subordinate tribunals, ought to be
the facility or difficulty of appeals." THE FEDERALIST 547 (1. Cooke ed. 1961) [hereinaf-
ter FEDERALIST].
132 1 Cai. R. 319 (N.Y. 1797).
133 Id.
134 Id. at 320.
135 Id. (emphasis in original).
136 Bedinger v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. (3 Call) 461, 469 (1803).
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vived into the nineteenth century. An expression by a New York
City lower court judge in the early 1800's was typical:
Nor is there any danger that innocence will suffer for want of a writ of
error. Criminal proceedings have thrown around the innocent so
many guards, that the writ of error is almost useless.... if there be the
least irregularity in the proceedings, the court must either grant a new
trial, or recommend the party to a pardon. It may be said, with truth,
that probably an instance cannot be found on record, of an innocent
man suffering, for want of a writ of error in a criminal case.
13 7
While trials were viewed as providing ample protection for in-
nocent defendants, especially through the provision of local juries,
writs of error provided such a narrow scope of review that they often
reversed convictions of the palpably guilty for the most trivial of rea-
sons.138 It is not surprising that the eighteenth century's conception
of review in criminal cases played a different role in terms of pro-
tecting defendants' rights than the contemporary appellate process.
The early reports do contain arguments in favor of review
based on the severe consequence a conviction has for the individual
defendant. However, when courts or prosecutors sounded this
theme, it was used as an instrumental device towards ends other
than protection of defendants' rights.
137 Lavett v. People, 7 Cow. 339, 343 (N.Y. 1827). It is worth noting that among the
safeguards mentioned by Recorder Riker in Lavett was the fact that the jury was the final
authority on the law as well as the facts.
138 See R. POUND, CRIMINAL supra note 90, at 161. One can see this sentiment ex-
pressed in the opinions ofJustice Yeates of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. In Span-
gler v. Commonwealth, 3 Binn. 533 (Pa. 1811), for example, the court considered a writ
of error from a conviction for larceny of bank notes. The defendant argued that the
indictment was defective because it did not specify the bank which issued the notes.
Justice Yeates, concurring in the judgment reversing the conviction, stated:
Where an indictment states a criminal charge with sufficient certainty, so that the
party may be fully informed thereby of the facts he is called upon to answer, and
prepare for his defence, it is disreputable to the administration of the law that he
should be suffered to escape with impunity for a mere slip of form, totally uncon-
nected with the merits of the case. At the same time we well know, that too great a
laxity in matters of this nature, will lead to consequences dangerous to innocence.
To preserve uniformity of decisions we are necessarily obliged to follow precedents;
the utmost uncertainty would ensue from our disregarding them.
Id. at 537. In White v. Commonwealth, 6 Binn. 179 (Pa. 1813),Justice Yeates dissented
from the judgment of the court on a writ of error which reversed the conviction in a
murder case on the ground that the precept to the sheriff commanding him to compel
the attendance of twenty-four "sober and judicious" persons to serve as jurors was de-
fective because it did not specify that the petit jurors as well as the grand jurors should
be from Cumberland County. justice Yeates stated:
Upon the whole, imperious duty constrains me to declare, that there does not ap-
pear to me such error on this record, as would justify me in reversing the judgment
against the prisoner. I entirely assent to the opinion, that too great nicety in pro-




The Virginia Court of Appeals decision in Commonwealth v. Caton
is an apt example.' 39 In Caton, the court confronted the issue of
whether it could resolve questions reported to it in criminal cases.
A General Court had convicted several men of treason; however,
before the sentence of death could be executed, the House of Dele-
gates issued a pardon with which the state Senate did not concur.
The trial judges reported the question of the validity of the pardon
to the Court of Appeals. The issue was a highly charged political
controversy. Before it could reach the merits, however, the Caton
court first had to resolve a challenge to its jurisdiction to entertain
questions referred to it in a criminal case. The court noted that
although the language in the statute authorizing this procedure did
not explicitly mention criminal jurisdiction, it would make no sense
to confine its use to civil matters. Judge Pendleton, President of the
Court, wrote:
If I were to consider this question in a political light, I should wonder
indeed, that disputes about property to the value of £50, which dwin-
dles into nothing when compared with the subject which gives rise to
the present discussion, might be removed for difficulty, and that in a
case where the judges are to decide between the safety of the state on
the one hand, and the life of a citizen on the other, however, over-
whelmed with doubts and difficulties, they must go through them and
determine without that assistance which they might wish to have on
the occasions; the reason for such assistance, must increase in propor-
tion to the magnitude of the subject.
140
While the opinion used an argument couched in language that
referred to the effect of a conviction for the defendant, the underly-
ing force that propelled the court to expand its jurisdiction was on
other grounds. The court politically manipulated the argument
about the consequences of criminal cases to bolster its conclusion
that it was the appropriate institution to decide important legal is-
sues. Especially in light of the fact that the court declared the par-
don invalid, one cannot fairly read the decision as expressing a
concern that review is necessary to protect defendants' rights.
141
139 8 Va. (4 Call) 5 (1782).
140 Id. at 16.
141 John Mason, the prosecutor in United States v. More, sounded a similar theme
before the United States Supreme Court when he argued for writs of error in matters
where life or liberty were at stake by noting they were available in civil cases where only
property was at issue. However, Mason used this argument in the service of a request
that the Court grant a writ of error to overturn a circuit court decision that favored the
defendant. It is noteworthy that Chief Justice Marshall's opinion rejecting Mason's
claim did not even allude to this argument. See supra note 15. One also find references
in arguments of defense counsel that review was necessary to serve the purpose of cor-
recting errors. Where the defendant's attorney made this type of claim, it was likely to
be based on a real concern for the defendant's rights. One can see this in the report of a
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2. Review and the Institutional Need for Uniformity
The major justification for review of criminal convictions in the
eighteenth century rested on institutional rather than individual
concerns. The eighteenth century courts in a number of states ar-
ticulated one major justification for the various types of review that
existed: promoting uniformity. Review provided a means for en-
suring the uniform application of the law. While each of the newly
formed states could rely on its colonial common law inheritance to
guide its trial judges, the central courts saw the need to ensure that
all the members of the judiciary moved in the same direction. Uni-
formity not only harmonized the law as an instrument of social con-
trol but served an important political function well. As an integral
part of the structure of the newly declared state governments, the
state courts had to maintain power over the direction of criminal
prosecutions as a means of securing political power in the nascent
Republic.
One can find repeated explanations in the early case reports of
the organizational need to have some sort of review process for
criminal cases. The importance these early trial judges placed on
getting the opinion of the full bench was expressed in Respublica v.
Cleaver.142 In Cleaver, the Circuit Court of Pennsylvania denied the
defendant's motion to quash a larceny indictment, but noted that if
the defendant was convicted, "[w]e can keep the matter under ad-
visement until we can consult our brothers in bank, and form a satis-
factory opinion on the subject. The code of criminal justice should
remain fixed and certain on the most solid grounds." 143
This attitude was echoed in a New York case, The People v. The
Justices of the Sessions of the County of Chenango.144 Chenango was a man-
damus action brought by the Attorney General against the lower
court judges, seeking to have the New York Supreme Court order
them to proceed to judgment in a criminal trial pending in the Gen-
eral Sessions Court in Chenango County. The lower court had con-
victed one Noah Taylor of a felony, but, on motion of the
1796 case, State v. Connor, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 34 (1796), which chronicles the arguments
of counsel on the issue of the eligibility of a defendant for bail pending the decision by
the Constitutional Court of his motion in arrest of judgment. After summarizing
sources of possible error, defense counsel reminded the court, "The constitution of our
country [has] therefore wisely established another, and higher tribunal than this court,
for the purpose of investigation and determining all those points, and ordering new
trials in all such cases." Id.
142 4 Yeates 69 (Pa. 1804).
143 Id. at 74. For other examples of cases where legal questions were reserved and
reported to the full bench, see Respublica v. Roberts, I Yeates 6 (Pa. 1791).
144 1 Johns. Cas. 180 (N.Y. 1797).
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defendant, they had granted a new trial on the ground that the ver-
dict was against the weight of the evidence.' 45
The possibility that a Sessions Court might have the power to
grant a new trial presented a grave problem to the Supreme Court.
Because of the procedural limitations on the means by which it
could supervise lower court proceedings, the Supreme Court would
have been unable to review the grant of a new trial. 146 The Court
clearly saw the need to enforce its view of the law on all the inferior
tribunals. The Supreme Court recognized that:
The jurisdiction of every country requires a regular gradation of
courts and a common centre ofjudicial power. This is essential to its
existence, and to preserve consistency and harmony in the administra-
tion ofjustice. . . if [lower court] proceedings were not subject to be
here reviewed, we might find different rules of law and of justice in
almost every county. This would introduce disorder and confusions,
and be inconsistent with a regular and uniform administration of
justice. 1
47
Thus, the need for institutional uniformity and consistency exerted
a strong influence in the creation of a formalized review process for
criminal cases.
III. A CLOSER LOOK AT REVIEW IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
It was against the backdrop of the existing state criminal justice
systems that the first federal courts were formed. Initially, the fed-
eral government under the Articles of Confederation did not have
its own judicial system. It relied on the state courts to try federal
cases in the first instance. 148 The central government became in-
volved only in cases of prize and capture, a specialized branch of
admiralty law dealing with ships seized at sea. In 1775, Congress
created a Court of Appeals in Prize Cases to hear appeals from state
courts in these matters. 149 Criminal cases, however, remained com-
pletely within the jurisdiction of the state court systems.
It was not until the Constitutional Convention met that the
shape of an independent federal judiciary was formed. The struc-
ture of the federal criminal justice system was a result of the Consti-
tution, the Bill of Rights, and the First Judiciary Act. The framers
145 Id.
146 Id. at 181.
147 Id.
148 See E. SURRENCY, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 7-11 (1987) [hereinafter E.
SURRENCY].
149 See H. BOURGUIGNON, THE FIRST FEDERAL COURT, THE FEDERAL APPELLATE PRIZE
COURT OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1775-1787, 45 (1977) [hereinafter H.
BOURGUIGNON].
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did not explicitly provide for review of convictions in criminal cases
in any of these documents. However, it does not follow that the lack
of an explicit appellate mechanism in criminal cases was an indica-
tion that the framers believed that review of federal convictions was
of no significance to the rights of defendants. Far from indicating a
lack of concern for defendants' rights, the absence of appellate re-
view may have been a consequence of fear of the power of the new
central government. Appellate review, especially the appeal process
which involved a new trial, was viewed with suspicion in many
quarters as a device which had the potential to limit the rights of
defendants because of the prospect that the prosecution could ob-
tain a new trial after an acquittal. In addition, the need for tradi-
tional appellate mechanisms was obviated in the federal courts, as
well as in the state courts, by the existence of a number of means at
the trial level to provide defendants with many of the advantages of
modern day review. The discussion of the federal system will begin
with a look at the development of the federal judiciary; it then will
examine the operation of the early federal criminal courts.
A. THE CONSTITUTION
The delegates to the Constitutional Convention had a basic
knowledge of the judicial structure of their own states and how it
operated.' 50 Thus, the delegates would have known about the com-
mon law tradition that denied review to felony defendants51 as well
as the varied means of review that took hold in the American
states. 152
The records of the Convention debates reveal little evidence of
a concern for grafting some means of review of criminal cases onto
the structure of the federal judiciary which was in the process of
being created by the convention delegates. 53 The major topics of
controversy that emerged concerning the court system were the
method of appointing judges and their tenure in office, whether in-
ferior federal courts should exist, the right to trial by jury, and the
scope of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over questions
150 SeeJ. GOEBEL, supra note 39, at 207.
151 See id. at 610.
152 See id. at 207. Not all of the members of the Constitutional Convention were law-
yers; however, they were educated in the general structure of the law. Blackstone's Com-
mentaries was considered a staple of an educated gentleman's library, and it is safe to say
that all of the delegates to the Convention were familiar with it. See R. POUND, CRIMINAL,
supra note 90, at 82.
153 See J. GOEBEL, supra note 39, at 196-251; Warren, New Light on the History of the
Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HAiv. L. REv. 49, 56 (1923) [hereinafter Warren].
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of fact. 154 Resolution of the issue of Supreme Court review in crimi-
nal cases was not a matter of great concern. It was not, however,
completely ignored.
Both the proponents and opponents of a strong federal judici-
ary first proposed plans for the structure of a court system that in-
cluded Supreme Court review of what was contemplated to be a
major class of federal criminal cases. Edward Randolph of Virginia
put forward a plan which formed the basis for much of the early
discussion. It provided for inferior federal courts "to hear [and] de-
termine in the first instance," and for a supreme tribunal "to hear
and determine in the dernier resort, all piracies & felonies on the
high seas .... ,,155 Since not even the federalists proposed that the
central government's interest in criminal matters should intrude
into areas traditionally policed by the states, crimes on the high seas
were a significant portion of what the delegates would have contem-
plated of federal criminal law. 156 When Randolph's provision was
debated, it was embroiled in the controversy over whether inferior
federal courts would supplant the existing power of state courts. As
a consequence, Randolph offered a substitute resolution that omit-
ted any explicit reference to piracy and felony jurisdiction at both
levels of the proposed federal courts. 157
An alternative plan, offered by William Paterson of New Jersey
three days after Randolph's amendment, did not provide for inferior
federal courts, but left the trial of federal matters to the existing
state court trial structure. However, it described a role for a
154 SeeJ. GOEBEL, supra note 39, at 196-25 1.
155 See id. at 207. Piracy and felonies on the high seas would have been traditionally
tried on the criminal side of an Admiralty court rather than in one of the common law
criminal courts such as the King's Bench. The English practice of conferring criminal
jurisdiction on the Admiralty court eventually gave way at the end of the eighteenth
century to a procedure in which the Admiralty judges referred such cases for trial to
judges of the common law courts sitting by virtue of a special commission. See H.
BOURGuiGNON, supra note 149, at 8-9. At the time of the Revolution, the jurisdiction of
admiralty courts to try criminal cases was well established. See E. SURRENCY, supra note
148, at 118-19. The initial grant ofjurisdiction to the federal trial courts, under the First
Judiciary Act of 1789, gave the district courts jurisdiction of all minor crimes and of-
fenses cognizable under the authority of the United States, committed within their dis-
tricts or upon the high seas. 1 Stat. 76-77. The circuit courts were given jurisdiction
concurrent with the district courts over minor crimes, and exclusive jurisdiction over all
other crimes, without any specific mention of crimes on the high seas. The first federal
criminal code, Act of April 30, 1790, 1 Stat. 112, made certain specific crimes on the
high seas capital offenses, and provided that the venue of the trial should be the district
where the offender was apprehended or first brought. Act of April 30, 1790, sec. 8, 1
Stat. 114.
156 See Letters from "A Federal Farmer", October 10, 1787, in H. STORING, THE ANTI-
FEDERALIST 53 (1985) [hereinafter H. STORING].
157 SeeJ. GOEBEL, supra note 39, at 216.
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supreme judicial tribunal that gave it appellate jurisdiction in cases
involving piracies and felonies on the high seas. 158 This language
also failed to survive the debates. No further reference to review in
criminal cases appeared. 159
The lack of attention devoted to review in criminal cases was
due, in part, to the resolution reached by the Convention on the
heated issue of the existence of inferior federal courts. The estab-
lishment of federal courts, other than the Supreme Court, was not
required by the Constitution; instead, the issue was delegated to
Congress for resolution. The solution to this controversy was a
compromise between the contending factions. 160 Since the exist-
ence of inferior federal courts might never have come to pass, it was
unnecessary for the Convention to address the question of review-
ing the judgments of those courts.
Thus, the ultimate resolution of the scope of the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction in Article III of the Constitution left
open the question of the availability of review in criminal matters.
The Constitution, which was sent out to the states for ratification,
provided only that "the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdic-
tion, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such
regulations as the Congress shall make." 161
The ratification process in Maryland and New York, however,
did call attention to the issue of review in criminal cases. Luther
Martin spoke in the Maryland Assembly against ratification on the
ground that the Constitution's grant of appellate jurisdiction with
respect to questions of fact nullified the right to a jury in criminal
cases. He argued that even if inferior federal courts were estab-
lished for the trial of federal crimes,
ajury would only be a needless expense, since, on an appeal, the determina-
tion of that jury, even on questions offact, however honest and upright, is
to be of no possible effect .... If, therefore, even in criminal cases, the
general government is not satisfied with the verdict of the jury, its of-
ficer may remove the prosecution to the Supreme Court, and there the
verdict of the jury is to be of no effect, but the judges of this court are to decide
upon the fact as well as the law .... ,1162
Martin saw a deliberate plan behind this dilution of the right to a
jury, and attributed it to the Federalists' fear that the local popula-
tion from whom the juries would be selected would be too partial to
158 See id. at 217.
159 See id. at 196-251.
160 See 3 M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONsTrrrioN OF THE UNITED STATES 80
(1913) [hereinafter M. FARRAND].
161 U.S. CONST., art. III, sec. 2.
162 M. FARRAND, supra note 160, at 221 (emphasis in original).
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state interests to be trusted with a case in which the federal govern-
ment was concerned.1
63
In New York, Robert Yates used the pseudonym "Brutus" to
write about the Constitution's grant of appellate power to the
Supreme Court. One of Brutus' letters addressed Article III, sec-
tion 2 and its application to criminal convictions:
The appellate jurisdiction granted to the supreme court, in this para-
graph, has justly been considered as one of the most objectionable
parts of the constitution .... By this article, appeals will lie to the
supreme court, in all criminal as well as civil causes. This I know, has
been disputed by some; but I presume the point will appear clear ....
If then this section extends the power of the judicial, to criminal cases,
it allows appeals in such cases .... I believe it is a new and unusual
thing to allow appeals in criminal matters. It is contrary to the sense of
our laws, and dangerous to the lives and liberties of the citizen. As our
law now stands, a person charged with a crime has a right to a fair and
impartial trial by ajury of his country, and their verdict is final. If he is
acquitted no other court can call upon him to answer for the same
crime. But by this system, a man may have had ever so fair a trial, have
been acquitted by ever so respectable ajury of his country; and still the
officer of the government who prosecutes, may appeal to the supreme
court. The whole matter may have a second hearing. By this means,
persons who may have disobliged those who execute the general gov-
ernment, may be subjected to intolerable oppression.
164
Other New York anti-federalists echoed these views.' 6 5 In response,
the Constitution's supporters at the New York ratification conven-
tion offered a resolution expressing the true intent of the document
to be that the Supreme Court, in exercising its appellate jurisdic-
tion, could not authorize a second trial in criminal cases.
16 6
The implication of this argument against review in criminal
cases is quite interesting because it sheds light on why the initial
scheme of the federal courts lacked this feature. If one is to take the
argument at face value, which may not be entirely warranted since
the anti-federalist letters of the time were not above erecting straw
men, 167 the prospect of review without the protection of the Bill of
Rights' Double Jeopardy Clause presented more danger of govern-
ment oppression than it did the possibility of protecting individual
163 See id. at 222.
164 Letters from "Brutus" (Feb. 28, 1788), in H. STORING, supra note 156, at 177-78.
165 See, e.g., Letters from "A Federal Farmer" (Oct. 10, 1787), in H. STORING, supra
note 156, at 54.
166 SeeJ. GOEBEL, supra note 39, at 405.
167 Hamilton, in Federalist No. 81, addressed at some length the implications of the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction as to questions of fact, and argued that it would
not allow the Court to re-examine facts determined by juries in common law trials. See
FEDERALIST, supra note 131, at 551.
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liberty. Although appeals of acquittals by the prosecutor were by no
means the norm in the state court systems, there were instances
where they did occur. 168 Thus, it was possible to see a danger of
prosecutorial abuse in Article III's language concerning appeal on
questions of fact. Since the Bill of Rights was not part of the Consti-
tution at the time of ratification, one explanation for the absence of
any feature ensuring review in criminal cases may be the fear that
Martin and Brutus identified.' 69
B. THE BILL OF RIGHTS
As with the debates over the Constitution, nothing in the Con-
gressional debates over the Bill of Rights directly addressed the
question of review of criminal convictions. The debates did address
the Supreme Court's appellate power, but the discussion was con-
fined to a concern over the effect it would have on civil cases. The
debate recognized a common fear that appealing one's case to
Washington would allow those rich enough to afford it an opportu-
nity to wear down litigants of ordinary means.' 70 Madison, in fact,
proposed as one of the original amendments to the Constitution an
article limiting the Court's appellate jurisdiction to cases where the
matter in controversy involved more than one thousand dollars.
17'
The context of the ensuing discussion, however, was confined en-
tirely to civil cases.
Yet, the debates on the Bill of Rights dealt with an issue rele-
vant to review in criminal cases; namely, the question of multiple
trials. The original version of the amendments to the Constitution
stated: "No person shall be subject, except in case of impeachment,
to more than one trial or one punishment for the same offense
...."172 While this language solved the problem of a potential gov-
ernment appeal of an acquittal that had troubled Luther Martin and
Robert Yates 173 , it raised another problem in the minds of Repre-
sentatives Benson and Sherman. They believed that this language
would abrogate the right of a defendant to move in arrest ofjudg-
168 North Carolina is one state where prosecutors in the eighteenth century very likely
exercised the power to appeal an acquittal and obtain a trial de novo. Compare State v.
M'Lelland, 1 N.C. (Cam. & Nor.) 569 (1803) (prosecutor appealed an acquittal) with
State v.Jones, 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 257 (1809) (state supreme court held that the state could
not appeal an acquittal).
169 See supra text accompanying notes 162-166.
170 SeeJ. GOEBEL, supra note 39, at 437.
171 See I Annals of Congress 452, 784 (1789).
172 SeeJ. GOEBEL, supra note 39, at 436. This section first came before the House in
mid-August.
173 See supra text accompanying notes 162-166.
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ment and obtain a new trial in order to correct an error. 174 A mo-
tion to strike the language dealing with "one trial" was defeated. 1 75
In the final form, however, the original, clumsy language was
stricken by the Senate, and the more traditional common law maxim
dealing with twice being put in jeopardy was inserted in its place.'
76
C. THE FIRST JUDICIARY ACT
The first Congress began work on the legislation that put flesh
on the skeleton of judicial authority described in the Constitution
well before the Bill of Rights took effect. In April, 1789, the Senate
appointed a committee to write a bill organizing the judiciary.' 77
The Bill of Rights, with its ban on double jeopardy, did not take
effect until Virginia ratified the amendments in December, 1791
(although it was approved by the Senate in September, 1789).178
The only reference in the record of the discussion of the FirstJudici-
ary Act on the issue of whether the Supreme Court's appellate juris-
diction should extend to criminal cases came from the writings of
members of the committee charged with drafting the legislation.
Caleb Strong of Massachusetts wrote an account of the initial stages
of the bill that included this description of the Supreme Court's ap-
pellate jurisdiction: "Writs of Error from the Circuit to the Supr.
Court in all Causes not criminal of which the Circuit Court has origi-
nal Cognizance and the matter in Dispute does not exceed 2000
Dolrs."' 179 However, the language expressly excluding criminal
cases from the scope of the writ of error was not included in any of
the existing drafts of the Act.
An official record of the Senate proceedings concerning the
First Judiciary Act does not exist. There is an indication, however,
that at least one Senator mentioned the lack of appeal in criminal
174 SeeJ. GOEBEL, supra note 39, at 436. Both Benson and Sherman were lawyers and
thus would have been familiar with the traditional formulation of the common law's
protection against jeopardy.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 448. The fifth amendment addresses the protection against double jeopardy
in the following language: "[nior shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
177 j. GOEBEL, supra note 39, at 458. TheJudiciary Bill was reported out of committee
injune. It was voted on by the Senate in July and sent to the House, which voted on it in
September.
178 The language in the Bill of Rights dealing with the question of double jeopardy
was not voted on by the Senate until early September. Id. at 448.
179 SeeJ. GOEBEL, supra note 39, at 462 n.19 (letter to Thomas Paine written May 24,
1789) (emphasis added). Ralph Izard of South Carolina wrote a similar account in a
letter dated April 24, 1789 to Edward Rutledge. See Holt, "To Establish Justice". Politics,
the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE LJ. 1421, 1530-
31 (full text of letter provided).
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cases in the debate on the legislation. Senator William Paterson of
New Jersey left preliminary notes and a draft outline of a speech he
gave on June 23, 1789, in opposition to an amendment that would
have restricted the inferior federal courts' original jurisdiction to
Admiralty cases, thereby leaving the trial of federal crimes to the
state courts. Paterson's notes contain the following: "How as to
Appeals - Bring Law Home - meet every Citizen in his own State -
not drag him 800 miles upon an appeal - The silent operation of
Law - or by Force - An appeal from Scotland to England - No appeal
in criminal Cases ... ."18o The amendment to which Paterson ad-
dressed himself would have confined non-admiralty federal cases to
the state courts, which would have left appeal to the United States
Supreme Court as the only federal role.' 8 ' Placed in the context of
supporting a system of inferior federal courts, Paterson's comment
about the lack of appeal in criminal cases may have been intended to
allay fears that defendants in federal criminal trials could be drag-
ged off to Washington by government appeals. The prospect that
common litigants in civil cases might find their resources quickly ex-
hausted in defending an appeal to Washington played a role in the
House debates over the Bill of Rights.18 2 Thus, it is possible that
the lack of review in criminal cases was seen as a protection for ordi-
nary citizens. However, one can only speculate about the meaning
of Paterson's remarks.
The House debate on the First Judiciary Act occurred contem-
poraneously with its discussion of the Bill of Rights. The House
debates hotly contested the existence of inferior federal courts and
their effect on the existing state court structure. The opponents of
the bill asserted that state courts could adjudicate any federal matter
that required a trial, including crimes, and that the availability of an
appeal in such cases to the federal Supreme Court would be all that
the constitutional scheme of government required. There is no
mention, however, of the issue of appeals in criminal cases.' 8 3
The final Judiciary Act provided for the use of writs of error
from the Supreme Court to the new federal circuit courts in civil
cases. It said nothing about review in criminal cases.' 8 4 There are a
180 See Casto, The First Congress's Understanding of its Authority over the Federal Courts'Juris-
diction, 26 B.C.L. REv. 1101, 1127-35 (1985) (full text of notes and draft outline given)
(emphasis added).
181 SeeJ. GOEBEL, supra note 39, at 494.
182 See id. at 437. Cf. id. at 47-48 (describing colonial propensity for litigation and
appeal).
183 See I Annals of Congress, 813, 826-65 (Aug. 1789).
184 Shortly after the new federal judicial system began operation, the House of Repre-
sentatives sought the opinion of the Attorney General on the plan which the Judiciary
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number of reasons that may have lead to this omission.
It is possible that the anti-Federalist argument against review
based on the fear of government appeals, voiced by Martin and
Yates' 85 and perhaps alluded to by Paterson, led to the restriction
on the Supreme Court's power. The timing of Congress' considera-
tion of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction and the Bill of
Right's double jeopardy provision support this hypothesis. The ma-
jor deliberations in the Senate on the Judiciary Act took place sev-
eral months before the double jeopardy section of the Bill of Rights
was first presented to the House. Thus, the decision about the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction may have been made in the
context of uncertainty about the implication that review would have
for the ability of the government to appeal an acquittal in a criminal
case.
It is also possible that the language that appeared in the final
Act was the result of a compromise that deliberately left the matter
unsettled. The Act neither expressly excluded writs of error in
criminal cases nor expressly allowed them. Thus, the Federalists,
who as Martin and Yates warned, really may have wanted to be able
to appeal jury verdicts of acquittal, still had the potential to argue,
as Mason did in the More case, that writs of error were still available.
By not expressly allowing writs of error, on the other hand, the anti-
Federalists were left with the argument that eventually prevailed in
Act had established. See F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME
COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 14 (1927) [hereinafter F. FRANK-
FURTER & J. LNDIS]. Attorney General Randolph, one of the authors of the Virginia
plan for the judiciary present at the Constitutional Convention, presented his report to
the House on New Year's eve of 1790. Id. The report contained Randolph's comments
on the existing Judiciary Act as well as his proposal for an improved bill. Randolph
envisioned a federal trial bench composed solely of district judges, sitting either in a
district court or in one of three circuit courts. See Report of the Attorney General,
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, Misc., No. 17, 27-28. His proposal did not provide for any
circuit-riding Supreme Court Justices. However, Randolph's plan did provide for
Supreme Court review of criminal cases. Unlike section 22 of the Judiciary Act, the
language of the provision in Randolph's proposal dealing with writs of error made spe-
cific reference to criminal convictions. His bill proposed that: "Writs of error shall be
issued ex debitojusticia [of right]; except in capital offenses, provided that the judgment,
exclusive of costs, shall amount to - dollars . . . and no writ of error shall issue in-a
capital offence .... " Id. at 32. The most reasonable interpretation of this language is
that it contemplated following the English common law tradition of allowing writs of
error of right in non-felony cases, since according to Blackstone, felonies were generally
capital crimes. See W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 104, at 94. If Randolph had meant to
exclude writs of error in all criminal cases, he would not have referred solely to "capital
offences." The House referred Randolph's report to the Committee of the Whole,
where it eventually died of neglect. See J. GOEBEL, supra note 39, at 542.
185 See supra text accompanying notes 162-166.
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More, namely that the Supreme Court did not have the power to
issue writs of error in criminal cases.
Other reasons have been advanced to explain the omission of
criminal cases in section 22 of the FirstJudiciary Act. Some histori-
ans have attributed it to the legislators' blind adoption of the com-
mon law position found in Blackstone. 186 However, if that was the
case, it is puzzling that writs of error were not permitted even in
federal misdemeanor cases, where the common law would have
granted them as a matter of right. Speculation also exists that the
lack of writs of error in criminal cases may have been a consequence
of the hostility in anti-federalist quarters to the Supreme Court's ap-
pellate jurisdiction in general. 187 Although, without the fear ex-
pressed by Martin and Yates concerning the prosecutor's use of
.review, it would seem that writs of error in criminal cases would
have worked to weaken the central government.
D. THE CRIMINAL CASELOAD OF THE FIRST FEDERAL COURTS
While the first form of our criminal justice system under the
Constitution did not include a means for defendants to obtain re-
view of their convictions, it does not mean that the system lacked all
of the features we associate with contemporary review. If one is
looking at the historical record for an original understanding of how
due process viewed the finality of a criminal trial and the need for
review, one cannot stop simply at the fact that the limited review
afforded by writs of error was unavailable in criminal cases. Some
aspects of the type of appellate review that we take for granted today
were also part of the federal criminal justice system at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution. It is relevant to set the question in
the context of the criminal caseload of the time.
Prior to the adoption of the Constitution, commentators as-
sumed that federal crimes would be confined to a small class of
cases dealing with treason, revenue offenses, counterfeiting and
crimes committed on the high seas or against the law of nations. 188
In reality, the actual business of our first federal trial courts was
186 SeeJ. GOEBEL, supra note 39, at 610. See also E. SURRENCY, supra note 148, at 215-16
(absence of criminal review in the First Judiciary Act due to lack of familiarly of eight-
eenth English lawyers with criminal procedure, since counsel in criminal cases in Eng-
land was not allowed until the nineteenth century).
187 SeeJ. GOEBEL, supra note 39, at 610.
188 See, e.g., Letters from "A Federal Farmer" (Oct. 10, 1787), in H. STORING, supra
note 156, at 53. This statement about what the scope of federal criminal law would be
was made by a prominent anti-Federalist, whom one would expect to have exaggerated
the case of the dangerous prospect that federal crimes presented in the context of an
argument against ratifying the Constitution.
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composed of ordinary civil disputes, admiralty cases, and actions
designed to aid the power of the federal government to impose im-
port duties.18 9 Only a small number of federal crimes existed, 190
and few such cases made their way to court. From 1790 to 1797, in
all of the federal circuit court system, there were only one hundred
forty-three criminal matters, or four percent of the total cases on the
docket.' 9 ' Moreover, of this one hundred forty-three total, fully
fifty-six came from Pennsylvania and were related to the Whiskey
Rebellion trials.' 92 Truly, criminal trials played a very minor role in
the business of the early federal courts.
E. FEATURES OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL TRIALS
1. Supreme Court Trial Judges
For criminal cases tried in early federal courts, it is also signifi-
cant to consider the type of bench before whom the defendant ap-
peared. The FirstJudiciary Act gave circuit courts the responsibility
for trying all but petty crimes. These courts were composed of
three judges, two of whom were assigned from the six members of
the Supreme Court.19 Thus, by creating a multi-judge bench for
each trial, the original scheme of the federal system provided crimi-
nal defendants with a tradeoff for their inability to obtain review of
the trial judge's rulings. 1
94
Moreover, by placing one-third of the Supreme Court on the
189 See F. FRANKFURTER &J. LANDIS, supra note 184, at 12.
190 The Supreme Court ultimately ruled that there was no jurisdiction to prosecute
common law crimes in federal courts. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 32 (1812). Until then, the subject was one of great controversy, and instances
of federal common law prosecutions did occur. See S. PRESSER, STUDIES IN THE HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT 32 (1982) [hereinafter S. PRESSER];
Warren, supra note 153, at 51.
191 See D. HENDERSON, COURTS FOR A NEW NATION 65-87 (1971) [hereinafter D.
HENDERSON].
192 Id. at 70-71.
193 The number of Supreme CourtJustices was reduced to one in 1793. Act of March
2, 1793, 1 Stat. 333.
194 When only one judge presided over a criminal trial, as was possible in the circuit
court for the district of Kentucky which had only a district judge and no Supreme Court
justice assigned to it for circuit duty, see F. FRANKFURTER &J. LANDIS, supra note 184, at
33, the lack of appeal lead to dissatisfaction. A report of the SenateJudiciary Committee
in 1829 complained that
[w]here a District Judge presides alone... this single option is decisive of the con-
troversy in every matter of law. The evil is more striking in criminal cases. The fiat
of an individual, which dooms the accused to imprisonment, or to death, is irresisti-
ble, irreversible. No appeal is allowed - no writ of error provided by law; and, from
the constitution of the Court, no disagreement can arise to invoke the protective
interposition of the supreme tribunal.
Id. (quoting SER. No. 181, SEN. Doc. 50, 20th Cong., 2d Sess. at 5).
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bench at each defendant's trial, the format offered some assurance
that the results the court reached on constitutional questions re-
flected, in some measure, the institutional view of the Supreme
Court as a whole. The dynamic of having a trial panel reflect the
view of the full court was a familiar one to American lawyers. Judge
Brackenridge of Pennsylvania reported an 1803 case in his book,
Law Miscellanies, which noted the effect of having two of the four
appellate judges preside at nisi prius trials:
[t]hat the court being constituted of but four judges, in the case of a
reference to two, there could not be a majority out of four to reverse
the opinion of two; a reason which it is well known did operate much
at the nisi prius courts to prevent appeals or motions in bank from that
which we had discovered to be the sense of the one half of the court
who had already heard the matter, considering such a motion or ap-
peal to be unavailing .... 195
2. Post-Conviction Motions
Despite the lack of writs of error, several mechanisms existed at
the time of the First Judiciary Act to review federal criminal convic-
tions. Unlike the practice in England, 96 the American system al-
lowed defendants to obtain review of their convictions by directing a
motion in arrest ofjudgment or a motion for a new trial to the same
court that convicted them. 197 Thus, defendants were not limited to
the first judgment *of a legal issue raised and determined in their
criminal trials. It is likely that motions in arrest of judgment were
available to defendants from the very beginning of the federal judi-
ciary. The defense attorney in the first capital conviction ever ob-
tained in a federal court, for example, attacked his client's
conviction on a motion in arrest of judgment, claiming the indict-
ment was defective. 198 Similarly, the First Judiciary Act provided
that all of the courts of the United States had the power to grant
new trials.' 9 9 Federal trial courts considered a number of cases on
195 H. BRACKENRIDGE, supra note 33, at 535 (quoting Galbraith v. Colt, W. Cir, Pa.,
1803).
196 J. ARCHBOLD, supra note 30, at 610-70.
197 See, e.g., United States v. Wood, 2 Wheeler's Crim. Cases 325 (U.S. Phil. Cir. Ct.
1818) (defendant moved for new trial and in arrest of judgment); J. ARCHBOLD, supra
note 30, at 616-17. But see Gibert v. United States, 25 F. Cas. 1287, 1297 (Mass. Cir. Ct.
1834) (Judge Story refused to grant a defendant's motion for a new trial on the ground
that double jeopardy prevents new trials).
198 United States v. Bird & Hansen, 14 American State Trials 232 (Mass. Cir. Ct.
1790) (Lawson ed.). See also United States v. Cantrill, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 167 (1807);
Orfield, Early Federal Criminal Procedure, 7 WAYNE L. REV. 503, 527 (1961).
199 First Judiciary Act of 1789, sec. 17, 1 Stat. 83.
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motions for new trial. 200
One of the first reported instances of a motion for a new trial in
a federal criminal case came in the 1799 trial of John Fries in the
Circuit Court of Pennsylvania. 20 ' Fries was charged with treason as
a result of his involvement with the insurrection in Northampton
County over the issue of tax collection. After the jury returned a
guilty verdict, the defense attorneys moved for a new trial. The
prosecutor doubted the power of the court to order a new trial in a
criminal case, but the judges could see no reason to allow such a
remedy in civil trials and to exclude it in criminal cases where a
man's life was at stake.20 2
Of the three issues raised in the new trial motion, only one had
been argued previously before the judges. At the start of the trial,
Fries' counsel had moved without success to change the venue to
the county where the treasonous acts were alleged to have oc-
curred.203 The new trial motion argued that the presiding magis-
trates, Iredell and Peters, did not place sufficient justification in the
record for denying the change of venue. Judge Iredell took great
offense at this argument, both because the basic question about the
venue of the trial had already been decided and because of the sug-
gestion that he had erred in not placing his reasons for the earlier
decision on the record. 20 4 Fries' attorney met the judge's ire with
both an apology and an explanation. He stated that he was sorry he
had given the court grounds for discomfort, but pointed out that in
criminal prosecutions, especially capital cases, the job of defense
counsel was to put forward every ground on behalf of his client.20
5
As it was common for courts to err, counsel was duty bound to point
out the error and argue that the mistake was of sufficient conse-
quence to afford his client relief. If the court agreed, it was fully
authorized to retract from its former opinion. 20 6 Nothing further
seems to have been made of this dispute, and the court went on to
consider the other two grounds asserted in the new trial motion.
20 7
200 See cases cited inJ. ARCHBOLD, supra note 30, at 610-70; Orfield, supra note 198, at
526.
201 F. WHARTON, STATE TRIALS OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE ADMINISTRATIONS
OF WASHINGTON AND ADAMS 458 (Phil. 1849) [hereinafter F. WHARTON].
202 Id. at 600.
203 Id. at 482.
204 Id. at 599.
205 Id. at 601.
206 Id. Counsel cited as authority for this proposition a passage from Blackstone deal-
ing with the power to grant new trials in civil cases.
207 Judge Iredell voted to grant the motion. Judge Peters voiced the opinion that the
motion did not have merit, but because of the importance of the appearance ofjustice in
this notorious case, he voted with Iredell, and Fries was given a new trial. Fries was
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Fries' case, though, established not only the legitimacy of new trial
motions in criminal cases, but also their use as a means to get a
reconsideration of an issue that had already been determined.
20 8
3. Certifying Questions to the Supreme Court
Another mechanism for review of federal criminal convictions
was to obtain the ruling of the Supreme Court on questions which a
divided trial court could not answer. The formal means of certifying
a question to the Supreme Court came into existence with the Judi-
ciary Act of 1802.209 An Act of 1793 changed the structure of the
Circuit Courts, reducing the number ofjudges to two. 210 The 1802
Act added a provision allowing them to certify questions on which
they were divided to the Supreme Court. Certification of questions
under the Act occurred frequently in criminal cases.
211
subsequently convicted and received a pardon. Legislation enacted in 1793 provided a
means to settle differences such as the one in Fries' case. If the two judges could not
agree, the case was continued to the succeeding court. Should the same thing happen a
second time with a different Supreme Court justice, then the opinion of the circuit-rid-
ing Supreme Court judge over his district court brother would prevail. See D. HENDER-
SON, supra note 191, at 44.
208 For an enumeration of the grounds on which American criminal courts granted
new trial motions as of the middle of the nineteenth century, seeJ. ARCHBOLD, supra note
30, at 610-70.
209 Act of April 29, 1802, 2 Stat. 156, 159.
210 Act of March 2, 1793, 1 Stat. 333. The bench would consist of one Supreme Court
justice and one districtjudge. Section 1 of the Act provided that if the district judge was
absent, the circuit court could consist of only the single Supreme Court justice. Id. In
February, 1794, the Justices of the Supreme Court sent a letter to President Washing-
ton, requesting him to transmit their views to the Congress on the impact of the changes
brought about by the 1793 Act. After acknowledging the relief the Justices felt over the
reduction the Act brought about in their circuit riding obligations, the letter stated:
It has already happened in more than one instance, that different judges sitting at
different times in the same court, but in similar causes, have decided in opposite
direction to each other, and that in cases in which the parties could not, as the law
now stands, have the benefit of writs of error. They therefore also submit to the
consideration of Congress, whether this evil naturally tending to render the law
unsettled and uncertain, and thereby to create apprehension and diffidence in the
public mind, does not require the interposition of Congress."
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, Misc. No. 46, at 77. The Justices modestly refrained from
suggesting specific resolutions, because some alternatives "would from the nature of
them, be capable of being ascribed to personal considerations." Id.
211 E.g., United States v. Kid & Watson, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 1 (1807); United States v.
Cantril, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 167 (1807); United States v. Potts, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 284
(1809); United States v. Tyler, I 1 U.S. (7 Cranch) 285 (1812); United States v. Chapels,
2 Wheeler's Crim. Cases 205 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1823); United States v. Perez, 2 Wheeler's
Crim. Cases 96 (N.Y. Cir. Ct. 1823); United States v. Courlay, 2 Wheeler's Crim. Cases
102 (N.Y. Cir. Ct. 1823). See Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157, 196 (1960); B. CURTIS, JURISDICTION, PRACTICE
AND PECULIARJURISPRUDENCE OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 82-83 (1880) (certi-
fication "very often used"). Note that the 1802 Act, supra note 209, at 158, allowed
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There is evidence, though, that even before the Act formalized
the practice, federal trial judges attempted to use a similar proce-
dure. In a 1798 trial, United States v. Worrall,2 12 defense counsel
moved in arrest of judgment on the ground that the indictment
failed to charge a crime properly within the jurisdiction of the court.
The indictment alleged that the defendant was guilty of the common
law offense of attempted bribery, but the federal courts did not have
the power to punish common law crimes. Justice Chase agreed with
the defendant, butJudge Peters believed the court had the authority
to sentence Worrall. Because of the division of opinion, both
judges and the prosecutor proposed to defense counsel that "the
case might be put into such a form, as would admit of obtaining the
ultimate decision of the Supreme Court, upon the important princi-
ple of the discussion. ' ' 21 3 Defense counsel declined to enter into a
compromise of that nature, probably concluding that he stood little
chance with his arguments in the Supreme Court.214 The court then
withdrew for a short consultation, which has been surmised to have
been with the other members of the Supreme Court to obtain their
views. 215 The judges returned, declared the defendant's sentence
mitigated in consideration of his circumstances, and sentenced him
to three months imprisonment and a $200 fine.
216
4. Habeas Corpus
Defendants in federal criminal cases were also able to obtain
review of a limited class of issues by seeking a writ of habeas corpus
directly with the Supreme Court. In the era of the establishment of
the federal courts, habeas corpus was available to criminal defend-
ants only prior to trial. 217 Its scope was confined to matters that
pertained to the ability of the trial court to hold the defendant in
custody. Under this rubric, however, a defendant could test both
the legality of his commitment and the jurisdiction of the court
which ordered his confinement. Some of the issues that fell under
these two headings were the same as claims that would have sur-
vived in a different format if review were possible after a guilty
verdict. 218
circuit courts to conduct a trial before only one judge, either the Supreme CourtJustice
or the district court judge.
212 F. WHARTON, supra note 201, at 188.
213 Id. at 198.
214 See S. PRESSER, supra note 190, at 35.
215 See F. WHARTON, supra note 201, at 199.
216 Id.
217 See Ex Parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Peters) 193 (1830).
218 For example, a defendant could raise the claim on pre-trial habeas corpus that the
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IV. THE CONCLUSION FROM HISTORY
While the historical record does not allow a definitive explana-
tion for the lack of review in federal criminal cases, it is fair to say
that its absence was not due to a general disregard for the rights of
criminal defendants. One simply has to look to all the provisions in
the Bill of Rights to find evidence of a deep concern over the need
to limit the power of the state in the criminal process. Even in the
original language of the Constitution, Article III's explicit inclusion
of the guarantee of a jury in criminal cases supports the conclusion
that the framers were concerned with protecting individuals from
the power of the federal government. The American public in the
eighteenth century held the jury in great awe as a means of guarding
individual liberty.21 9
Nor is it fair to attribute the lack of review in the federal system
to a general disregard for the political value of uniformity. Criminal
convictions from state courts which denied the defendant a federal
right were the proper subject of a writ of error under section 25 of
the First Judiciary Act.220 Chief Justice Marshall, in upholding the
constitutionality of this grant of jurisdiction in Cohens v. Virginia,
stressed the political need for such review by writing: "[t]he neces-
sity of uniformity, as well as correctness in expounding the constitu-
tion and laws of the United States, would itself suggest the propriety
of vesting in some single tribunal the power of deciding, in the last
resort, all cases in which they are involved." 221
What conclusion can one draw, then, from the lack of criminal
appellate jurisdiction? It seems fair to conclude that review per se
was not seen as a fundamental right of all criminal defendants. At
common law, only those charged with misdemeanors had a right to
a writ of error. In the state court systems, while review was a com-
mon feature, it was not premised on a view that it existed primarily
for the benefit of the defendants. On the other hand, nothing in the
historical record suggests that the Due Process Clause was intended
to condone leaving the final determination of all constitutional is-
acts he was alleged to have committed did not constitute a crime. The limits of habeas
corpus jurisdiction required the claim to be couched in the language that probable cause
did not exist to warrant the defendant's custody, but it did allow a habeas court to in-
quire into what would otherwise be the merits of the prosecutor's case. See, e.g., Ex Parte
Bollman & Swartout, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807). In addition, until Tarble's Case, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871), was decided in 1871, state court habeas corpus actions re-
mained available to federal defendants in confinement to review the legality of their
custody. See L. ORFIELD, supra note 28, at 245.
219 SeeJ. GOEBEL, supra note 39, at 87; E. SURRENCY, supra note 148, at 216.
220 FirstJudiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 85-86.
221 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 416 (1821).
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sues to an individual trialjudge. Eighteenth century federal defend-
ants had an absolute right to have a multi-judge panel, which
originally included one-third of the bench of the Supreme Court.
These judges not only made the original determination of an issue
at trial, but could also be called upon to reconsider their rulings
after a conviction by the use of motions in arrest ofjudgment or for
a new trial. Indeed, only a few years after the adoption of the Con-
stitution, defendants had access to the discretionary review mecha-
nism afforded by the certification procedure.
In Jones v. Barnes, Justice Brennan, dissenting with Justice Mar-
shall, took the Court to task for unnecessarily repeating the dis-
claimer about a constitutional right to appeal. He went on to argue:
If the question were to come before us in a proper case, I have little
doubt that the passage of some 90 years since McKane vs. Durston...
would lead us to reassess ... I also have little doubt that we would
decide that a state must afford at least some opportunity for review of
convictions, whether through the familiar mechanism of appeal or
through some form of collateral proceeding. There are few, if any,
situations in our system ofjustice in which a single judge is given unre-
viewable discretion over matters concerning a person's liberty or
property, and the reversal rate of criminal convictions on mandatory
appeals in the state court, while not overwhelming, is certainly high
enough to suggest that depriving defendants of their right to appeal
would expose them to an unacceptable risk of erroneous convic-
tion.... Of course, a case presenting this question is unlikely to arise,
for the very reason that a right of appeal is now universal for all signifi-
cant criminal convictions.
222
If it is ever appropriate for history to foreclose debate over the
meaning of a part of the Constitution, the issue of a requirement for
some means of review of criminal convictions does not qualify. The
question should be open to further inquiry.
222 463 U.S. 745, 756 n.1 (1983).
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